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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION — A MATERIAL CULTURE STUDY  
 
In the following chapters, the history of USS North Carolina (BB-55), a World War 
II (WWII) battleship that served in the Pacific theater, will be evaluated through the 
analysis and preservation of pieces of the ship’s material culture. Many mundane, or 
everyday, artifacts are acquired and stored in museum collections but go unnoticed as 
they are considered unexceptional because they were mass-produced, had utilitarian 
functions, or were simply overlooked for an artifact with a better story. But even the 
most average artifact could have been significant in the day-to-day life of its users, 
producers, or benefactors. Given the opportunity, all artifacts likely have an important 
history to tell. Examples of mundane World War II artifacts can help fill in the details and 
create a more well-rounded and authentic World War II story for the public.  
Use of material culture concepts, including “use-life” and “object biographies,” 
can help recreate life cycles and connections between seemingly unrelated artifacts. 
Use-life studies often look at artifacts as passive objects: something to which things 
happen (Gosden and Marshall 2010). In contrast, object biography studies give artifacts 
agency. “As people and objects gather time, movement, and change, they are 
constantly transformed, and these transformations…are tied up with each other” 
(Gosden and Marshall 2010:5). Artifacts can thus be examined to show the connections 
and tell the metaphoric biography. This biography has different points of interest, just as 
books have chapters. These points constitute different segments of an artifact’s life. 
Object biography is used to better understand the artifacts and their influence. By first 
examining use-life to understand the foundation of the story, objects can move from 
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passive to active through an explanation of their context and biography. This thesis will 
utilize the concepts of use-life and object biography to examine how artifacts are 
created, used, and altered by people and to show the objects’ agencies and how they 
influence their surroundings, respectively. It will do so by using three artifacts from North 
Carolina: the Kingfisher sea sled (Figure 1), the vertical plotting board (Figure 2), and a 
stretcher (Figure 3). 
It will answer the research question: how can the study and preservation of 
mundane objects contribute to our understanding of World War II experiences on board 
North Carolina? The following subsidiary questions will help to answer the larger 
research question:  
 What are the biographies of the sled, stretcher, and plotting board? 
 How are these mundane objects and their biographies connected? 
 To what stories and experiences about World War II and North Carolina 
do the artifacts communicate with a visitor? 
 How can the stories of mundane objects be related to the public in a 
meaningful way? 
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FIGURE 1. USS North Carolina’s sea sled (Author 2013) 
 
 
FIGURE 2. USS North Carolina's vertical plotting board in the Combat Information Center (CIC) (Author 2014) 
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FIGURE 3. One of USS North Carolina's stretchers in storage (Author 2013) 
 
Because historical research, material culture and archaeological theory, and 
museum studies need to be integrated for this thesis, no one set of literature can cover 
its entirety. Journal databases and library catalogs were used to search for 
anthropological, historical, archaeological, and education books and peer-reviewed 
articles connected with the thesis through pre-defined key words, like material culture, 
use-life, cultural biographies, USS North Carolina, and World War II. Source material 
was carefully organized into a bibliography and developed into a literature review 
(Chapter 3). This thesis relies and preferences oral accounts, specifically personal 
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narrations of the sailors and crew of North Carolina, in an effort to tell the crews’ stories 
as opposed to a more traditional history of the ship. As such, fewer official government 
documents are referenced. 
Primary sources come from Joyner Library at East Carolina University (ECU), 
specifically the Rare Manuscripts and Special Collection, and the National Archives in 
Washington, D.C. Sources include oral histories, vessel correspondence, and field 
manuals. The Special Collections Department of Joyner Library at ECU houses 64 oral 
histories transcripts from North Carolina crewmembers, which were read for mentions of 
the artifacts or activities related to the artifacts. Because the collections are not 
digitized, the author read every document.  
Finally, analysis of the use-life and preservation of the artifacts was considered. 
The author visually inspected the artifacts’ conditions and staining to carefully identify 
the artifacts’ original purposes, potential modifications, and to assess the artifacts’ 
conditions today. All this was completed in an effort to connect these artifacts’ historical 
stories, preservation, and display or storage in a meaningful way that can benefit the 
overall story of the battleship.  
Archaeologists, historians, and curators alike must consider how best to convey 
a relatable history to the public. Artifacts, even the most mundane examples, help 
elaborate and showcase significance in relation to people, technology, or historical 
events. The Kingfisher sled, the stretcher, and the plotting board offer an opportunity for 
research and interpretation of mundane pieces of World War II history seldom seen by 
the public. These showcase important technological advances, and without them the 
battleship would not have been such an effective tool during World War II. To preserve 
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these objects’ stories, the history and life of a Kingfisher sled, a stretcher, and a vertical 
plotting board need to be studied using object biography and use-life approaches. 
Visitors and researchers alike will, thus, gain a better understanding of the battleship’s 
story, the technologies of World War II, and, most importantly, the implications of 
mundane artifacts on this history. 
  
CHAPTER 2: A HISTORY OF USS NORTH CAROLINA (BB-55) 
 
BB-55, USS North Carolina, was the first American battleship built after World 
War I. Its construction started in 1937 following the guidelines of the Second London 
Naval Treaty. After completion, BB-55 served in the Pacific Campaign during World War 
II (Doyle 2011:3). It was decommissioned in 1947, but because the ship had such an 
impressive history and because it was so well-loved during the war, veteran groups, the 
state of North Carolina, and even school children actively fought to save the ship. It was 
taken to North Carolina in 1961. Today, it is located in Wilmington as a memorial and 
museum (Blee 1982:92).  
While the largest artifact in the collection is the battleship, BB-55, stories of many 
ships named North Carolina can be found in the memorial. In all, seven naval vessels 
have carried the title. The first was launched in 1820 and used through the Civil War 
(Figure 4). Another two ships, named SS North Carolina, were captured, converted, and 
used during the Civil War – one by the Union and one by the Confederacy. The final 
North Carolina in use during the Civil War was the ironclad CSS North Carolina, but this 
ship was destroyed due to teredo worm, or teredo navalis, damage on the green wood 
used for its hull. The next ship, only technically the second U.S. naval ship bearing the 
name USS North Carolina, was an armored cruiser (ACR-12), authorized on 27 April 
1904 (Figure 5). After World War I, plans were drawn for the new battleship USS North 
Carolina (BB- 52), but construction was halted because of the Five Power Treaty, and 
the ship was never finished (Corbett 1961) (Figure 6). Currently, the U.S. Navy has USS 
North Carolina (SSN-777), a Virginia-class attack submarine launched in 2007 
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(Battleship North Carolina Museum 2016) (Figure 7). The most famous of these 
vessels, however, is arguably the third USS North Carolina (BB-55). A North Carolina-
class battleship begun prior to, and finished during World War II, this ship carries a total 
of 12 battle stars from its engagements in the Pacific (Doyle 2011:3).  
 
FIGURE 4. USS North Carolina commissioned in 1820 (Tommy Trampp, n.d.)  
 
 
FIGURE 5. USS North Carolina (CA-12), commissioned in 1908 (U.S. Navy 1908) 
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FIGURE 6. USS North Carolina (BB-52), under construction (National Archives 1921) 
 
 
FIGURE 7. USS North Carolina (SSN-777) (U.S. Navy 2009) 
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NORTH CAROLINA (BB-55): A HISTORY FROM THE CREW’S PERSPECTIVE 
USS North Carolina (BB-55) was the first battleship constructed since World War 
I (Figure 8). At its completion date, it was the biggest, fastest ship in the U.S. Navy, 
replacing North Dakota-class vessels. The keel was laid on 27 October 1937 in the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard. The ship was launched on 13 June 1940, and commissioned 9 
April 1941 (Shoker 2006:5). BB-55 was more than 728 feet long, had a maximum armor 
thickness of 18 inches, displaced 35,000 tons, and made 27 knots. When it was in 
service, there were 108 officers and 1,772 enlisted crew onboard at any given time. Its 
armament boasted nine 16-inch .45 caliber, twenty 5-inch .38 caliber, sixty 40 
millimeter, and thirty-six 20 millimeter guns. The ship also had two plane catapults aft to 
launch the three OS2U Vought-Sikorsky “Kingfisher” floatplanes (Mobley 1985:4) 
(Figure 9).  
 
FIGURE 8. USS North Carolina (BB-55), commissioned in 1941 (U.S. Navy 1943) 
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FIGURE 9. Aft deck of BB-55 with port and starboard catapults and Kingfishers (Doyle 2011:43) 
 
From its commission date, this battleship captured the hearts not only of the men 
who served aboard it, but also of its country. Leo Neumann, who reported to North 
Carolina before its commissioning, recalled the ship’s entry into Pearl Harbor (Figure 
10). 
They began to cheer. All the people were lined up along the docks, the 
yardmen stopped working, everybody saw this magnificent ship coming 
into Pearl Harbor. All the carnage was still there. The ships being still in 
their sunken positions. Believe it or not, even as late as July, bodies were 
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still popping out of the water, which was fearful for the people even to 
work in the water... It was horrible! This is what we saw. This is what we 
felt and we couldn’t believe how everybody began to cheer when we came 
into that port. It was magnificent. It was tremendous, unexpected, and a 
thrill. Never forgotten by any of us who were there (Newmann 1975:3).  
 
FIGURE 10. The destruction left after the attack on Pearl Harbor (U.S. Navy 1941) 
 
During its sea trials, North Carolina had so much publicity it became known as 
the “Showboat.” At one point, the ship fired all of its guns at once, shaking the whole 
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vessel, supposedly making a flash that temporarily blinded anyone on deck and that 
sent a shock wave that knocked the glass out of binoculars (Lott and Sumrall 1982:8).  
These were called structural firing test of course. We had fired several 
rounds one and two gun singles and so forth to operate the turrets and so 
forth and all I can tell you it was a tremendous blast. It popped several 
hundred light bulbs; it broke some lenses in the thirty-six inch search 
lights; we had a couple of boats aboard and it opened the strakes of these 
boats, pealing [sic] them back. Certain rivets and bolts that were over 
tightened and so forth, from shock, let go. This was what we wanted to 
learn in structural firing test, what can she take, what in future design do 
we have to improve on. We had what we called the angled roller bearing 
in the turrets instead of the old flat like on the old battleships so that the 
shock was transmitted in a tangent into your barbette instead of a direct 
broadside, and I can’t say that there was any tremendous shift about the 
ship when she fired these dead to port. When the sixteens, nine sixteens 
and ten five inch thirty-eights, were all fired at one time. There was a slight 
roll, there was quite a shock. Structural-wise she certainly did pass the 
tests (Tucker 1975:4).  
Immediately after passing its sea trials, the ship began loading crew. After picking up 
sailors along the Atlantic Coast, including Norfolk and the Florida Keys, North Carolina 
made its way through the Panama Canal (Neumann 1975:2) (Figure 11). This was a 
challenge for the battleship. With about six inches to the canal wall on either side, it was 
not surprising that the ship scraped the canal. Charlie Rosell remembers hearing the 
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scraping from the second gun turret where he was stationed, six decks down (Rosell 
1975:3).  
 
FIGURE 11. USS North Carolina in the Panama Canal (U.S. Navy 1945) 
 
The ship headed toward Hawaii after its trip through the canal and made a 
riotous entry into Pearl Harbor:  
A grizzled chief mounted a turret, and led his shipmates in a cheer. The 
cheering spread from ship to ship, until thousands of voices all around the 
harbor took it up in a roar that was heard halfway to Honolulu. There in that 
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great new battleship was evidence that America, the sleeping giant, had at 
last awakened and was stirring. More of the fleet soared (Blee 1982:44). 
North Carolina entered the Pacific theater in July 1942. It was much needed 
reinforcement for the Pacific fleet, which had not yet recovered from the devastation of 
the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 that left only one outdated American 
battleship and three aircraft carriers in the Pacific (Blee 1982:43). 7–9 August 1942, 
North Carolina assisted in landing approximately 19,000 Marines on the shores of 
Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The relative ease of the initial landings was challenged on 9 
August when Japanese cruisers quickly sunk four American ships without significant 
opposition off Guadalcanal (Blee 1982:44).  
Later that month, North Carolina participated in the Battle of the Eastern 
Solomon Islands. BB-55 escorted the aircraft carriers USS Saratoga and USS 
Enterprise into battle against the Japanese fleet reinforcements. Japanese aircraft 
attempted to damage the American fleet, but the aircraft carriers and battleship 
successfully thwarted the attacks. North Carolina is credited with destroying seven 
enemy aircraft during this battle; additionally, the battleship also assisted in sinking at 
least seven other aircraft, and the group’s pilots sunk one Japanese ship (Blee 
1982:46). 
Cooperative crew efforts were organized when the ship was attacked throughout 
the war, no matter the location. The ship was, more than once, attacked by Japanese 
fighter pilots during its time at sea (Figure 12). While the Japanese planes were 
occasionally performing reconnaissance, they were also sent to bombard the 
Americans. One infamous example of this included, by the crew’s estimation, 180 
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enemy planes (Jones 1975:9). Normally some American pilots circled their ships and 
shot down approaching enemy planes, but “I understand that the morale of the crew 
members of all the navy ships was getting so low that they let some planes come in and 
attack us” (Jones 1975:9). 
 
 
FIGURE 12. Air fight seen from the deck of a World War II battleship (U.S. Navy 1942) 
 
 
 
Jerry Gonzales remembers another plane attack, in which a plane barely missed 
the 20 millimeter mount he was working on. Luckily for him, he was below deck, passing 
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ammunition up to the guns. He only found out about the incident afterward. The 
Japanese fighter came so close “they could all see his face real good and he looked like 
he was scared and he looked down and they looked up and they didn’t shoot him” 
(Gonzales 1975:4). If the craft had been any closer, the crew likely would have shot the 
plane’s fantail causing the aircraft to crash onto the gun mount, killing the gun crew 
instantly (Gonzales 1975:4).  
It was also not always easy to distinguish American planes from Japanese 
planes. Japanese planes liked to attack at sunrise or sunset, probably because the 
lighting covered the markings on their planes. One sunset, Gonzales was working his 
gun when another crewmember saw an unrecognizable plane. Gonzales brushed it off 
as an F4, an American fighter, claiming his friend’s worries as ridiculous. Then several 
other men started shooting at the aircraft and Gonzales realized he had been mistaken; 
Japanese planes dropped two bombs in that attack that barely missed a nearby aircraft 
carrier (Gonzales 1975:4).  
The men below deck, loading ammunition or working in damage control, for 
instance, had a far different experience than those who could see the commotion. The 
former could only hear the guns firing. The five-inch guns were used for longer ranges 
and “all you heard [were the guns]… go boom, boom, boom, boom, boom” (Gonzales 
1975:5). The middle range guns, forty-millimeters, would “cut in boom-boom, boom-
boom, beside the boom, boom, boom” (Gonzales 1975:5). Finally the twenty-millimeters 
would start: 
…trill, trill, trill and then they were right overhead and all of a sudden it 
[was] quiet. Then about ten of fifteen minutes later all of it [would] start 
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again, boom, boom; then you got that boom-boom, boom-boom; trill, trill, 
trill, all of a sudden it is quiet again. That is the way the battle went 
(Gonzalez 1975:5). 
 There was a system to rank the severity of battles: X-ray, Yoke, or Zed. X-ray 
was the least severe and most men could stay as they were, but in the case of a Zed 
situation everyone was to report to their battle station (Frost 1975:3). One such Zed 
situation arose suddenly on 15 September 1942 (Neumann 1975:9). USS Hornet and 
USS Wasp, protected by a fleet of cruisers, destroyers, and battleship North Carolina, 
were carrying marines to reinforce Guadalcanal. The force was approximately 250 miles 
south of the island when Wasp was torpedoed three times on the starboard side and 
sunk by a Japanese submarine. Initially unaware of the cause, or severity, of Wasp’s 
situation, Hornet and escort North Carolina continued to slowly steam toward 
Guadalcanal. The warnings came too late for North Carolina to avoid the torpedo 
headed into its port bow. The ship watched the destroyer USS O’Brien take a 
devastating blow and was then hit at 2:52 p.m. (Blee 1982:46–50). After the ship gave a 
large shake, men started running to their stations. Charles “Jack” Frost stopped 
someone and asked what had happened. “And he said, ‘I think we got hit with a 
torpedo’” (Frost 1975:2–3).  
 Some men, like Willie Jones, were in their bunks as the torpedo hit. “[T]his ship 
itself could not protect itself from submarines” (Jones 1975:2). So, even though Wasp 
was sunk and BB-55’s crew watched several other American ships take damaging 
blows, there was nothing North Carolina could do when the radar stopped showing 
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targets (Resen 1975:7). Thus, all hands were relieved of their duty stations. 
Unfortunately, it was not long until a torpedo found its way to North Carolina.  
Well, the first word I heard on it was the destroyer 411 said the torpedo 
had just passed under it aheading [sic] for us. And just a second later a 
lookout spotted it and said he had seen a torpedo wake coming…So, they 
had just throwed [sic] the rudders hard down, and we were turning to port 
and when that hit, why, there was a cloud of water that went higher than 
the main mast of the ship and went on up, a big cloud of water (Greenway 
1975:1). 
This was a tragedy, but proved the ship’s technological successes too. It was a 
tragedy because five sailors were lost and 23 were wounded, but even with a hole in the 
side, the ship was able to stay at sea another five days (Sisco 1975:4; Blee 1982:56). It 
showed the power of North Carolina and its crew because of the way it was handled. 
The damage control team did their jobs quickly and effectively. Enough so that, within 
three turns from the incident, North Carolina was no longer listing. And even with a 32- 
by 18-foot torpedo-hole in the side of the ship, North Carolina was reported to be 
making 28 knots (Doyle 2011:82, Calder 1975:5) (Figure 13).  
Wasp’s damage was too severe to save that vessel. It was abandoned at 3:20 
p.m. and sunk at 9:00 p.m., killing 193 men and wounding 367 more. O’Brien was also 
lucky to make it out of the fight. The destroyer made it to New Caledonia for temporary 
repairs. It was headed back to the States for further maintenance when the damage 
overwhelmed the ship. It sunk 19 October off Samoa (Blee 1982:50–51).  
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FIGURE 13. Torpedo damage to USS North Carolina (U.S. Navy 1942) 
After this event, North Carolina traveled to Pearl Harbor, arriving 30 September 
1942, for repair. It took only 30 days to fix the ship. After additionally installing new anti-
aircraft guns, the vessel was sent back into the Pacific theater. The speed of repair 
allowed North Carolina to return to Guadalcanal on 9 December. Battleships continued 
to protect and escort the force’s aircraft carriers, but after the loss of Hornet in October, 
there was hesitation in risking these ships. This meant that North Carolina saw little 
action in 1943 (Blee 1982:57–59).  
The crew continued to drill, but during one such training exercise there was an 
accident. Target practice was necessary, but no enemy vessels were in the area. 
Instead the crew was ordered to shoot starshells, or giant flares, at destroyer USS Kidd 
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(Figure 14). All the safety precautions were taken and the shells were set to explode 
above and aft of the ship (Horton 1975:2–3). 
 
FIGURE 14. Starshells over Iwo Jima (U.S. Navy 1945) 
 
 Michael Horton was assigned as first loader on one of the five-inch guns. It was 
still dark outside and the crewmembers were at their mounts. Horton decided to nap 
before the exercise; after all, automatic weaponry and starshells could not be too 
difficult, but he was abruptly woken because he and his gun mate were the only ones at 
this station (Horton 1975:2). Taking Horton by the collar, his gun mate yelled, “LOAD! 
LOAD! LOAD!” Word had finally come from the officers to fire. The two of them loaded 
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the powder and the round, and aimed the gun at a forty-five degree angle as instructed. 
But something went wrong, and the gun jerked back to a horizontal position. The 
automatic weapon shot the starshell straight at Kidd, lighting part of the ship on fire 
(Horton 1975:2–3). Luckily, no one was hurt in the commotion.  
These two little hands are the ones that loaded it, but I was only a 
seaman, so it wasn’t my responsibility. This was the officers’ and the 
directors’ fault, I suppose.… A little parachute was supposed to drop out, 
and it never got a chance until she hit. Like I say, it was good to be a 
seaman. You didn’t have the responsibility. Even though I loaded it, I was 
under orders, you see (Horton 1975:3). 
Commander Joe Stryker took on the task of pacifying the injured egos of Kidd’s 
crew. The cooks on North Carolina spent an entire night baking a cake for Kidd. Three 
days later, when all the smaller ships had to come alongside BB-55 to refuel, North 
Carolina’s crew presented the destroyer with 50 gallons of ice cream and a beautiful 
cake (Blee 1982:61). This eased most of the hostilities. The beer party the battleship 
crew threw for the destroyer upon their return to Pearl Harbor likely ended all hard 
feelings (Cope 1975:3).  
Though North Carolina had a less-than-exciting year in 1943, other U.S. ships 
were busily securing the Solomon Islands. By November, renewed battleship and 
cruiser action was necessary across the Central Pacific. This action was led by Admiral 
Nimitz and was initiated by an offensive against the Gilbert Islands (Blee 1982:62). BB-
55 and five other fast battleships escorted aircraft carriers to help cover the attacks. The 
U.S. group was frequently bombarded by incoming enemy aircraft, and on 8 December, 
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the battleships attacked the Japanese airfield at Nauru (Blee 1982:65). The Gilbert 
Islands were successfully recovered.  
On 20 January 1944, North Carolina joined with seven other fast battleships, 
twelve fast aircraft carriers, six cruisers, and thrity-four destroyers to form Task Force 
58. This formidable force was often divided into several groups that traveled separately 
and carried out a variety of missions (Blee 1982:65). North Carolina’s first mission, 
following this formative endeavor, was bombarding Roi and Namur Islands as part of 
the invasion of the Marshall Islands. BB-55 fired 360 16-inch rounds and more than 
2,000 5-inch rounds over 29 and 30 January, destroying the Japanese airfield and 
sinking a troop transport. North Carolina was able to recover charts from that shipwreck, 
which were found to be invaluable to future operations (Blee 1982:66).  
Majuro Atoll was subsequently taken, without much opposition. This proved to be 
an essential acquisition for the following month’s operations. From February to July 
1944, Task Force 58 attacked Japanese posts including those at Guam, Saipan, Tinian, 
Palau, Yap, Woleai, Truk, northern New Guinea, and the Marianas. North Carolina was 
involved in all major advances except those undertaken in May, when the ship returned 
to Pearl Harbor for rudder repairs.  
Only days after the initial troop landing on Saipan, Task Force 58 anticipated 
Japanese defensive actions. Therefore, a subdivision, known as Task Group 58.7, was 
tasked with defending the force. North Carolina was part of this “Battle Line…one of the 
rare occasions on which this [formation] occurred during World War II in the Pacific” 
(Blee 1982:70). While no defensive measures against the Task Force took place, The 
Battle of the Philippine Sea on 18 and 19 June 1944 saw the Japanese suffer the loss 
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of three aircraft carriers, 476 aircraft, and 445 aviators; while the Americans only 
suffered the loss of 140 aircraft, 76 aviators, and slight damage to USS Indiana and 
USS South Dakota. This proved a decisive victory for the United States, even though 
the Task Force was unable to finish the Japanese naval fleet before it retreated (Blee 
1982:70–71). 
North Carolina returned to the United States from July to September 1944 for 
overhaul in Puget Sound Navy Yard, Washington, during which the crew was granted 
30 days leave. Then BB-55 returned to the Pacific in early November. A new Task 
Force, numbered 38, was formed. It consisted mainly of the fast carriers and their 
escorts.  
By this time, the Japanese had begun implementing kamikaze attacks regularly, 
which caused great distress. The crew had to worry about environmental disasters too. 
On 18 December 1944, a typhoon hit the task force. With winds over 100 knots, 70-foot 
seas, and visibility as low as a few feet, BB-55 rolled up to 30 degrees in the port and 
starboard directions. It was more or less unharmed by the storm, with the exception of 
its three aircraft which were virtually destroyed. The task force lost 800 men and three 
destroyers that capsized in the storm (Blee, 1882:73–75).  
In January 1945, during the landing at Lingayen Gulf in the Philippines, Task 
Force 38 was fighting in the South China Sea. “Following each of the many forays, or 
series of strikes, by the fast carriers, all or part of the task force was withdrawn to a less 
advanced area...the task force was given a period of several days or more for rest, 
recreation and ship maintenance” (Blee 1982:72). These breaks in action were called 
“breathers” and the ships’ crews would take the time to relax (Blee 1982:72–73).  
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But the fighting was not complete, and on 19 February 1945, D-Day, North 
Carolina fired 806 16-inch rounds in support of a 70,000-man Marine landing invasion 
on Iwo Jima. The bombardment continued for another three days, and BB-55 fired a 
total of 3,608 rounds at targets on the island. In the days immediately preceding and 
following the Iwo Jima attack, North Carolina assisted in strikes on Tokyo, too. These 
strikes were performed by an American group, totaling 96 miles of ships in formation, 
more than 1,000 aircraft, and over 100,000 total crew members (Blee 1982:79–81).  
On 19 March 1945, North Carolina witnessed the near destruction of the aircraft 
carrier USS Franklin only 50 miles off the Japanese mainland. Two bombs were 
dropped on the ship which resulted in rapid damage. More than 1,500 men were thrown 
or jumped overboard. In total, 724 were killed and 256 were wounded (Blee 1982: 82).  
North Carolina participated in the bombardment of Okinawa on 24 March, before 
the invasion began on 1 April. Five days later, the ship was accidently hit by friendly fire 
attempting to shoot down an incoming kamikaze. This killed three men and wounded 44 
others. Still, BB-55 bombarded the areas around Okinawa for 40 days. By the end of 
this fight, kamikaze’s sunk or cause 20 American ships to be scuttled. Twenty-two other 
vessels were badly enough damaged that they could not be repaired by the end of the 
war. When North Carolina was ordered back to Pearl Harbor for repairs, it took with it an 
additional 250 men who were either “fatigued” or who had been previously assigned to 
damaged or sunk vessels (Blee 1982: 82–86). 
In July, the repaired BB-55 joined Task Force 38 in an attack at an industrial 
complex near Tokyo. While the allied forces expected suicidal resistance, none was 
experienced. Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur then began planning an invasion of 
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the Japanese mainland. Suicidal resistance was again expected, as was major loss of 
life on both sides. In early August, Task Force 38 was ordered to cease air operations 
and to withdraw 300 miles to sea. On 6 and 9 August, atomic bombs were dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively. On 15 August, Task Force 38, including North 
Carolina and the other ships of the Third Fleet, were given word that the Japanese had 
agreed to surrender. On 2 September 1945, BB-55’s crew was informed that the 
Japanese surrendered in Tokyo Bay onboard USS Missouri (Blee 1982:86–88). In total, 
the ship traveled more than 300,000 miles (Sisco 1974:5). 
The crew was relieved. One crewmember who had been with the battleship the 
whole war said: 
It was like a reprieve — a deliverance. It was a time to be deeply thankful, 
and we were. Beyond that, I was so drained in every way after those years 
of war that entering Tokyo Bay didn’t really matter much. All I really cared 
about was thank God, it’s over and we can go home” (Blee 1982:88).  
In total, only two North Carolina-class battleships were built. They were 
discontinued for the newer, better South Dakota-class, commissioned on 20 March 
1942, and for aircraft carriers that were proving themselves to be the superior vessels 
(Wiper 2009:1). The crew on BB-55 was the reason it did not fade into obscurity. They 
loved their ship. They had a strange, but wonderful, morale that kept them united. By 
the end of World War II, the Japanese claimed to have sunk North Carolina six times; it 
received 12 battle stars for the crew’s efforts; participated in nine shore bombardments; 
and destroyed at least, and likely more than, 24 enemy airplanes (Blee 1982:90–91).  
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 For all the horrors the men had to face, their morale kept them in high spirits 
most of the time. The crew bent or broke some rules and had fun with, or at the 
expense of, their fellow crew members too. The men spent their free time writing letters 
home, gambling, and watching movies in the galley. They even had some pets — dogs 
and chickens — the latter of which were sold in Seattle (Farrar 1975:10).  
Jerry Gonzales built model ships inside bottles, dropping one that almost caused 
a fire on deck (Gonzales 1975:3). Michael Horton made and sold sardine sandwiches 
(Horton 1975:6). Joseph Iacono fished off the ship’s side, once catching a sand shark, 
which he convinced one of his friends to cook for him (Iacono 1975:3). Edward Cope 
wrote in a diary about his experiences, the people he missed, and his girlfriend back 
home (she would eventually become his wife) (Cope 1975:4). He also made alcohol 
when he could find the ingredients. Because his job was servicing fans, including air 
conditioner fans, he often got everything he needed. “Servicing one of these fans 
usually took only a very short time. But, when you needed some yeast or cake or cookie 
or your clothes starched…we could take an awful lot of time if things were not 
forthcoming” (Cope 1975:3). 
First, he made wine out of the juice taken from canned cherries. But when one 
sailor got a little too sick off the cherry wine, this operation had to stop. The sailor got so 
sick, in fact, that he had to sleep in the Marines’ bay, where they had congregated. They 
put him in an empty top rack to let him to sleep off his buzz. Instead, he vomited onto 
everyone below him. The Marines dragged him to sickbay and Cope took the incident 
as a sign to lay low. Once the incident was forgotten, however, he tried to make “pure 
grain alchie” which, once perfected, became the new favorite (Cope 1975:2–3).  
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There were other pranks played too. Cope recalls a strange incident in the 
bathrooms:  
there always seemed to be a waiting line at most enlisted men’s heads. To 
shorten the wait on more than one occasion, we would set fire to some 
balled up tissue and let it flow under the men reading books or just taking 
too long to relieve themselves on the trough type latrines. This caused 
many a warm if not singed buttocks, but it did afford a seat to the next 
man if he was fast enough to gain the hastily vacated seat… (Cope 
1975:1). 
These anecdotal stories are important to understanding life aboard North 
Carolina. The crew considered the living conditions to be exceptional: 
As far as living conditions on board this ship, I believe you couldn’t have 
asked for anything cleaner and better. The crew were in fine shape to do 
the work. They got along good. I never saw any personal fights between 
anybody….We had a regular good menu (Wenck 1975:6). 
Without pastimes, humor, and even some childish drama, the ship may have 
been a dull place to live and, consequently, a dull place to work. North Carolina became 
these men’s home. They played, worked, loved, lost, and fought hard for their floating 
city. They had some tough fights and often thought they might die, but a happy crew is a 
successful crew. And North Carolina was undoubtedly successful. From its tour in the 
South China Sea to bombing Okinawa, this ship helped the war effort tremendously. It 
also became a symbol for the rest of the Pacific fleet. The “Showboat” was a symbol of 
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the power of the United States military. And because of North Carolina’s singularly high 
morale, it became an extremely beloved ship. After it was decommissioned in 1947, it 
was moved to Wilmington, North Carolina, in 1962 for public display as a memorial and 
museum (Lott and Sumrall 1982:30). It was saved in large part because the crew loved 
it so much that they could not see it sold for scrap. “I am real pleased to have served on 
the North Carolina… I’m a proud man. I don’t think it [was a good ship], I know it” 
(Babcock 1975:4).  
 Today, North Carolina has been lovingly transformed into a floating memorial and 
museum in the Cape Fear River. While the Navy still holds permanent rights to the ship 
and can take it back if necessary; the state, with the help of thousands of citizens, 
raised 330,000 dollars to move the vessel to its new home and to use it as a memorial 
to show the history of World War II and to keep the legacy of North Carolina, and its 
crew, alive (Blee 1982:92).  
  
CHAPTER 3:  OBJECTS AND THEIR HISTORIES 
 
Mundane artifacts have often been overlooked in museum collections for more 
glamorous, large, or inherently explicatory objects, but material culture studies have 
expanded the possibilities for interpretation. For example, North Carolina’s sailors’ 
bunks, officer’s silver service, and 16-inch guns are very attractive exhibits for visiting 
tourists. These objects show everyday life, the remnant “Old Navy” expectations of 
officers, and the power of the ship: each a detail of life on the ship. Inevitably, these 
pieces have a deeper history than shown at face value to the public. They make a point, 
sometimes without the guest even realizing it. These pieces did affect the sailors who 
used them. They also affect a visitor’s experience on the battleship today. But stories 
can be shared using mundane artifacts like the sea sled, stretcher, and plotting board, 
too. This will be accomplished by looking at the object’s use-life and biography.  
MATERIAL CULTURE STUDIES 
Material culture encompasses all artifacts, from the rare and valuable to the 
mundane and vernacular (Harvey 2009). Traditionally, only the rare or valuable artifacts 
were kept, and these were placed behind glass to be ogled by museum visitors. 
Recently, however, there has been a push to focus on what mundane objects can tell us 
(Deetz 1996). Orchestrated not just by museum personnel, but also by archaeologists, 
historians, and other social scientists, this has allowed the field to grow past fetishism 
and become an accepted interdisciplinary study, benefitting researchers in seemingly 
unrelated fields (Berger 2009).  
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Reviewing selected readings from material culture studies, a wide number of 
previously underexplored segments of social science fields can be seen (Knappett 
2009; Knappett and Malafouris 1998). Material culture studies have begun to implement 
archaeological theories to expand the field and make it more culturally and academically 
relevant. This explains why books on the subject have an emphasis on methods and 
case studies. 
Professionals using material culture have tried to base the field in archaeology’s 
pre-defined parameters and theories (Berger 2009; Deetz 1998; Harvey 2009). This 
creates a lack of writing on theories specifically behind material culture studies. Though 
academics have cited other fields that could provide background for material culture — 
sociology, history, and anthropology, for example — archaeological theory has been the 
only one readily applied (Knappett 2009). Maybe this is because the fields are both 
object-oriented and therefore more closely linked, but it appears that material culture 
studies is a subdiscipline of archaeology that can use ethnographic and historic data to 
supplement the findings.  
 Understanding people, life ways, cultural trends, and thought processes are the 
main objectives of many social sciences. Everything humans do relates back to their 
culture and their thought processes. Material culture is a manifestation of the human 
experience, but without realizing the impact it can have on defining the human 
experience, it is often overlooked. Today, many material culture books focus on trying to 
find how commonplace, or mundane, objects actively define or affect the world around 
them (Berger 2009; Knappett 2005; Harvey 2009; Deetz 1996; Lemonnier 2012).   
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Several books have been written on material culture theory, including: Arthur Asa 
Berger’s (2009) What Objects Mean: An Introduction to Material Culture, Carl 
Knappatt’s (2005) Thinking through Material Culture, and Karen Harvey’s (2009) History 
and Material Culture: A Student’s Guide to Approaching Alternative Sources. 
Additionally, books, like Deetz’s (1996) In Small Things Forgotten, Pierre Lemonnier’s 
(2012) Mundane Objects: Materiality and Non Verbal Communication, and Karen 
Harvey’s (2009) History and Material Culture, use case studies to show that history is 
enhanced when material culture is involved. It is easier and more entertaining to read 
and understand a history that involves all of the little things people make attachments 
with rather than to try to comprehend a theoretical framework with no application.  
Deetz (1996) shares several of his case studies with the reader, in In Small 
Things Forgotten, to show the importance of material culture. His observations have 
changed how historians now view black and white servant relations during the 1660s, 
how Chesapeake homes were built (cheaply), and how the smoking pipe evolved from 
both white and black traditions. He also emphasizes that material culture studies have 
an advantage when used with historical archaeology because artifacts can collaborate 
or contradict the written record and because historic material culture is more likely to 
have survived (Deetz 1996). The burial environment can preserve artifacts, but the 
environment is also a major deterioration factor. What Deetz means is that objects with 
shorter histories, which have likely been shelved or only recently inadvertently buried, 
are less likely to have deteriorated because they have not been effected by factors like 
corrosion or erosion for as long as prehistoric artifacts. That means there is a higher 
likelihood that historic mundane objects have survived. The North Carolina examples 
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studied in this paper are historic and intend to expand the history of the battleship 
through a case study similar to Deetz’s examples. 
Knappett (2005) touches on the interdisciplinary nature of material culture in his 
book Thinking through Material Culture: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Knappett 
admonishes the academic community for allowing archaeology to be the sole 
department focusing on material culture data in their research. He pushes for different 
academic disciplines to use these types of data, stating: “It is hoped that this book has 
contributed to this development by suggesting new paths and intersections…of the 
relationship of mind and matter” (Knappet 2005:168–169). He provides history and 
basic definitions in the field’s theories and methods and argues that material culture can 
be used to work from object to behavior, which can be especially useful when there is 
no written record to follow, when filling in personal details and even when collaborating 
or discrediting a dramatic primary source (Knappett 2005). While the history of North 
Carolina is known, hopefully the artifacts studied in the following chapters can inform 
visitors and researchers about the innovation and personal stories associated with the 
ship’s daily functions.  
Berger’s (2009) book uses physiological and cultural theories to explain material 
culture, including Freudian psychological, semiotic, sociological, Marxist, 
anthropological, and archaeological theories. He emphasizes that material culture is a 
multidisciplinary way of understanding artifacts. The book is split into three sections, 
covering the theoretical framework, applications of the models, and analysis of these 
ideas within society. Looking at artifacts as simple as Coca-Cola bottles or milk cartons, 
the author explains that these artifacts may seem easy to define, but with closer 
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scrutiny, they become complex material evidence of daily life (Berger 2009:145–152, 
189–194). For example, if you were able to time travel, how would you explain a Coca-
Cola bottle and how it is produced, or what it is used for, to someone from the 16th 
century? Many mundane artifacts, like the three North Carolina examples, could be 
rather difficult to explain initially, but may showcase technological advance, 
manufacturing techniques, or day-to-day activities. 
History and Material Culture: A Student’s Guide to Approaching Alternative 
Sources (Harvey 2009) seeks to explain what material culture is by studying its different 
aspects, including landscapes and typologies, in a series of essays. Harvey asks the 
questions, “How can artifacts be used in history?” and “What can objects offer the 
historian?” (Harvey 2009:1). These questions address the author’s differentiation 
between two methods of thinking about material culture: one is object-centered and 
focuses on technological advances, the other is object-driven and focused on the 
information objects can provide about more complex social relationships (Harvey 
2009:2). The North Carolina examples can offer connections to technological advance 
and can, with the help of sailors’ stories, inform about the importance of mundane 
objects to the experience on the battleship. 
 Material culture studies can also affect the way researchers view memory, 
production, and how we assign value to artifacts. These are illustrated in works such as 
Andrew Jones’ (2007) Memory and Material Culture, which uses different theoretical 
approaches to explain why memory is associated with specific artifacts. Carl Knappett 
and Lambros Malafouris’ (1998) book Material Agency: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric 
Approach treats objects as active players in their surroundings. Daniel Miller’s (1987) 
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Material Culture and Mass Production discusses the relationship between society, 
material culture, and industrial production. Each of these studies adapts a different 
theoretical basis to explain the complex interactions between artifacts and society and 
help reveal the “biography” of the artifacts and their significance to the world, similar to 
this thesis’s purpose of connecting three North Carolina artifacts to the larger ship’s and 
crews’ stories.  
DEFINING THE “MUNDANE” AND “VERNACULAR” 
A mundane object is one that has the “capacity to be unnoticed, to quietly 
mediate, that is reproduce, what have become the commonalities of everyday life” 
(Michael 2003:128). Mike Michael (2003) argues, in “Between the Mundane and the 
Exotic: Time for a Different Sociotechnical Stuff,” that everyday objects, like “the paper 
clip, the zip/zipper, Catseyes, the ring-pull/pull-top, the Post-It note, Velcro, the ballpoint 
pen, [and] the child-resistant cap,” are technologies that have become mundane 
(Michael 2003:127). Once, they were new and exciting innovations, but they have 
become the things people take for granted. His article tries to connect new technologies 
with the old and explain how their relationship makes a more complete story. It takes 
complex technologies to reproduce the mundane: “walking boots, may be ‘mundane’ 
technological artifacts, but we can expect that in their design, production, distribution 
and marketing are entailed the most exotic of technologies” (Michael 2003:132). He 
tries to explain that, while people see walking boots, for example, as everyday objects, 
someone took the time to understand the anatomy and needs of the foot to make an 
effective design; different groups created technologies to find, source, and form each 
piece involved in the production; yet another individual or group managed distribution; 
someone was hired to market these mundane walking boots with technologies like 
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television, internet, radio, newspaper, window displays; and finally, someone buys, 
wears, loves, and throws away a single example of this technology for archaeologists to 
find years later. What has been thought of as simple, instead, can tell us a complex 
story when it is examined from conception, through production and distribution, and to 
an individual. The mundane artifacts from North Carolina studied in this thesis will also, 
likely, have innovative aspects, but their uses certainly prove them mundane.   
Another important term is vernacular. Widely used to describe architecture, this 
term can also be applied to artifacts. Vernacular has a variety of definitions and 
connotations, as explored in Kingston Heath’s (2003) “Defining the Nature of 
Vernacular.” Heath explains that the word is often used by architects to describe “folk 
endeavors” (Heath 2003:48), but has come to be “a somewhat condescending way to 
refer to poorly conceived, personalized, or watered-down versions of high style” (Heath 
2003:48). Heath argues that this word takes on a definition and connotation of its own 
for every person who uses it. He, instead, tries to revise the definition so it can be better 
understood and used in the academic study of architecture. Heath wants architecture to 
be seen and studied for its value and inspirations and says that “the growing awareness 
of vernacular architecture has served to democratize our understanding…and they 
make us aware that all levels of culture can and should inform us” (Heath 2003:54). 
These terms, mundane and vernacular, can be used as synonyms, but are often 
associated with different fields. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015), 
vernacular is associated with biology, linguistics, and architecture, while mundane is 
associated with the commonplace. While “mundane” has not been used in academic 
discourse, but rather colloquial conversation, it has come to be a popular term in 
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material culture studies. Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015) defines vernacular as “of or 
relating to the common style of a particular time, place, or group.” Mundane is defined 
as “of, relating to, or characteristic of the world” or “characterized by the practical, 
transitory, and ordinary: commonplace” (Merriam-Webster 2015).  
Both mundane and vernacular should represent and define objects that have 
become common. These are not meant to be derogatory terms, but rather should be 
used as Heath describes to “make us aware that all levels of culture can and should 
inform us” (Heath 2003:54). However, cultural institutions often seem to focus on 
expensive, large, or impressive artifacts, even though archaeological and material 
culture studies have shown that mundane and vernacular artifacts can still inform 
human history. In fact, these artifacts create the everyday experience more than their 
more impressive counterparts.  
The commonplace can then be used to understand how people spent their daily 
lives. Heli Holttinen (2014) suggests, in “How practices inform the materialization of 
cultural ideals in mundane consumption,” that “in routine situations such as weekday 
dinners, cultural ideals are negotiated and enacted (or not enacted) many times a day; 
week in and week out; year in and year out” (Holttinen 2014:574). By looking at 
consumer behaviors, Holttinen tries to extract culture through their everyday 
consumption. The idea is that routines and habits can be reconstructed through what 
people buy regularly (Holttinen 2014). This theory can be extended to objects that are 
continuously reproduced, or even improved. By looking at commonplace artifacts, like 
those found on North Carolina, an archaeologist should be able to infer why an object 
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was produced, reproduced, altered, and improved. This constitutes an object’s “use-life” 
or “cultural biography.”  
“CULTURAL BIOGRAPHIES” VS. “USE-LIFE” — OPPOSING VIEWS 
Archaeology has long looked at artifacts to say something about human culture, 
but the focus has only recently focused on telling the artifact’s story. Two approaches to 
doing this include object biography and use-life. These concepts sound 
interchangeable, but the theories behind them are very different.  
Use-life is a processual idea that focuses “on changes to the morphological or 
functional characteristics of an object” (Gosden and Marshall 1999:169). This means 
that an object is changed by people over time. This is, no doubt, a true statement, but 
use-life only tells the passive side of an artifact’s story. Never is an artifact actively 
changing the world or the people around it. Chris Gosden and Yvonne Marshall’s (1999) 
article “The Cultural Biography of Objects” argues that use-life analysis is too shallow 
because it does “not address the way social interactions involving people and object 
create meaning” (Gosden and Marshall 1999:169). For example, a flaked lithic is 
constantly used, reduced, reformed, and re-used. Use-life histories would look at this 
cycle and never connect its effects on the humans who used it or how and why they 
changed or reshaped it (Gosden and Marshall 1999).  
Cultural biographical approaches, however, attempt to consider and document 
the way in which objects and people affect each other. “Meaning emerges from social 
action and the purpose of an artefact biography is to illuminate that process” (Gosden 
and Marshall 1999:170). By looking at the entire history — from conception, to creation, 
to use, to modification, to re-use, to reproduction, to loss, to museum collection — an 
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object collects history, meaning, and value from a variety of sources and effects and is 
affected by and affects a variety of people and other non-human things. All object 
biographies aim to connect people to the artifacts. Several articles have been written 
using both use-life and object biography theories in case studies.  
Shott (1996) explains the need to measure use-life to better understand site 
formation processes in “Mortal Pots: On Use Life and Vessel Size in the Formation of 
Ceramic Assemblages.” He believes that, to understand a prehistoric artifact, 
archaeologists must understand all the processes it took to arrive at that place. A big 
part of this process is the time the artifact was in use. He makes positive correlations 
between ceramic vessel size and a pot’s use-life, no matter the culture of origin. In this 
way, he is trying to find measurable data that will ultimately explain site formation. His 
data is limited, he says, because size and use-life are not directly related, but heavily 
influence one another because of manufacture, material, nature of use, number of pots 
in a household, and socioeconomic status of the owner (Shott 1996:480). This 
conclusion shows that it is not easy to estimate use-life from one factor, but factors as 
simple as vessel size can be the starting point for further study.  
Shott and Sillitoe (2001) try to find a formula to estimate use-life in “The Mortality 
of Things: Correlates of Use Life in Wola Material Culture Using Age-at-Census Data.” 
By using age-at-census data, the authors were able to find positive statistical 
correlations between use-life, size, and value in Wola ceramic vessels and arrowheads 
(Shott and Sillitoe 2001). In “Modeling Use-Life Distributions in Archaeology Using New 
Guinea Wola Ethnographic Data” (2004), Shott and Sillitoe expand their use-life 
research to say that these estimates “are vital to archaeological inference” using 
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ethnographic data as an example to understand archaeological use-life of the same 
ceramic vessels and arrowheads (Shott and Sillitoe 2004:340). Their models are not 
definitive, and they admit that estimating use-life in archaeological collections will not be 
easy, but they still urge archaeologists to try. Ultimately, “we do simply need more data” 
to better understand formation processes and explain why objects show up more or less 
readily in discard assemblages (Shott and Sillitoe 2004:353).  
Barbara L. Voss (2012) discusses the research potential of the curatorial process 
in at-risk collections, in “Curation as Research: A Case Study in Orphaned and 
Underreported Archaeological Collections.” She says that, for collections that lack 
provenance data, “accessioning, cataloging, rehousing, contextualizing, and 
conserving” can serve as a research tool to understand the pieces, and she urges 
professionals to see the potential in curation as research to help save at-risk collections 
(Voss 2012:146). While this article does not explicitly call this “use-life data,” Voss is 
advocating artifact centric study without, necessarily, mentioning the connection to a 
human story.  
Similarly, Alastair Owens, Nigel Jefferies, Karen Wehner, and Rupert Featherby’s 
(2010) “Fragments of the Modern City: Material Culture and the Rhythms of Everyday 
Life in Victorian London” does not explicitly state a use-life theoretical background, but 
their study focuses on the disposal patterns of everyday Victorian Londoners in hopes 
of starting a revisionary history that focuses less on the wealthy and more on the 
average people (Owens et al. 2010:213). The authors admit, though, that it is 
challenging to weave a convincing narrative with a lack of ethnographic data for the 
socioeconomic class studied or a large enough scale to accept the findings as 
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statistically significant (Owens et al. 2010:224). As such, their material culture study is 
more of a preliminary use-life study.  
None of these studies in and of themselves directly relate to the conclusions 
drawn in this thesis, but they all show that use-life is a viable and important part of an 
object's story. All of these studies hold the potential to tell a complex cultural biography, 
too, if the material culture can be better connected with the people using it. By first 
creating a use-life story, this thesis will build cultural biographies of the artifacts studied. 
There are a number of case studies in cultural biographies too. “Stories from 
Exile: Fragments from the Cultural Biography of the Parthenon (or ‘Elgin’) Marbles,” by 
Yannis Hamilakis (1999), attempts to show “that a cultural biography approach may 
prove a more interesting and rewarding avenue for the discussion of issues of cultural 
politics” (Hamilakis 1999:304). Hamilakis (1999) talks about the history surrounding 
several phases of the Parthenon friezes from their original purpose through their life in 
the British Museum to show that the purpose and story of the pieces changes and 
grows with every new perspective. He admits that it is a fragmented cultural biography, 
as it does not cover the friezes’ entire history, but it is a starting point and accurately 
portrays the “paradoxes, ambiguities, and ironies surrounding the cultural life of this 
group of material culture” (Hamilakis 1999:314).  
Evi Gorgianni (2011) studies the biographies of 32 terracotta figurines found in 
Ayia Irini, in “Goddess, Lost Ancestors, and Dolls: A Cultural Biography of the Ayia Irini 
Terracotta Statues.” Gorgianni says that, much like a traditional biography, studying the 
biography of these artifacts can exhibit “the qualities with which things are endowed in 
each context, thereby revealing their trajectories of transformation [and] also expose 
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latent features of the societies that adopted them” (Gorgianni 2011:636). Gorgianni 
shows that in all three contexts studied, the terracotta statues carry a religious mystery 
for the viewers. She states: “It matters not whether the new audience fully understands 
the former meaning(s) of an object, in most cases the new meaning, value, and function 
bear only a tangential relationship (or none at all) to its perceived values and functions 
in former societies or contexts…” (Gorgianni 2011:651).  
“The Cultural Biography of a Western Australian War Memorial,” by John R. 
Stephens (2013), examines the use of cultural biography to understand the community 
and ideology surrounding Katanning War Memorial in Western Australia (Stephens 
2013). He concludes that the local community has a complicated love/hate relationship 
with the memorial and that the memorial helps shape interaction, instead of passively 
standing by while the community takes action against it (Stephens 2013:673). This 
shows that political objects can affect the emotions and thoughts of community 
members in ways that were unexpected at conception.  
Judith T. Zeitlin’s (2009) article, “The Cultural Biography of a Musical Instrument: 
Little Hulei as Sounding Object, Antique, Prop, and Relic,” specifically discusses a 
musical instrument’s biography relating to two of its many historical owners. Zeitlin 
offers this biography as only part of the instrument’s history, but gives great detail to the 
instrument’s relationship with these two owners. She explores this history through 
historical documentation from each owner, including “literacy, theatrical, visual, and 
printed display” (Zeitlin 2009:396). This article argues that the instrument’s biography 
halts at its entry into the museum, partially because it is so highly valued that it is not 
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shown to the public, but also because it will, likely, never be played again (Zietlin 
2009:436–437).  
Hamilakis (1999), Gorgianni (2011), and Stephens (2013) conclude that the 
modern context is just as important and adds a new layer to the artifact’s biography. All 
three examples show that the perceived purpose of the objects, political or religious, 
may change, but audiences can still appreciate the general idea of meaning. Zietlin 
(2009) disagrees, saying that the biography is halted when the artifact enters a 
museum. For her instrument, this may be a shallow version of reality. The artifact is no 
longer played and few people get the privilege of seeing it, but it lives on and gains 
respect and adoration in its current home. While this may not be an exciting portion of 
the story, the instrument’s biography, like all object biographies, will continue until the 
artifact disappears. These publications show that active explanation even of partial 
artifact biographies can showcase greater meaning to the public than passively viewing 
an artifact at face value.  
Some articles combine or reinterpret use-life and cultural biographical theories, 
like Annemarie Money’s (2007) article, “Material Culture and the Living Room: The 
Appropriation and Use of Goods in Everyday Life.” This article explores the connection 
between people and objects in their living rooms and how these connections affect 
consumption. She looks at these connections by asking questions of 50 subjects about 
the meaning of things in their living rooms and concludes that people create meaning 
with their objects and are not “merely passive consumers” (Money 2007:373). This 
anthropological study shows that people do, in fact, create emotive connections with 
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their material possessions: justifying archaeological studies of material culture as a way 
of understanding the connection between object and person.  
DISPLAYING CONNECTIONS: EDUCATIONAL APPROACHES 
 While it is essential to the larger history to use these theoretical approaches to 
understand and weave an artifact’s story for museum display, one must ask: how can 
this be related to and understood by the general public? Current thinking in 
developmental psychology and education suggest that the way children and non-expert 
audiences learn science and technology is through hands on manipulation of objects, 
narrative storytelling, and conversation. By taking the immersive and hands-on 
experience that the battleship already provides, and sprinkling a few rare artifacts 
throughout, like the three discussed in this thesis, the museum can tell narrative stories 
that start conversations among guests and ensure that they leave the museum with a 
better understanding of the ship, the artifacts, and World War II.  
Adding open-ended, conversation-starting questions can encourage discussion 
and can supplement the use of hands-on exhibits and narrative stories to future 
comprehension and retention. Questions about “what,” “how,” and “why,” referred to as 
“wh-questions” promote conversation and encourage discussion (Jant, Haden, Uttal, 
and Babcock 2014:2030). Questions like these can easily be added to informational 
signage to encourage visitors to really think about an artifacts function.  
Additionally, hands-on discovery is thought to be one of the leading way 
schildren learn about subjects (Jant et al 2014:2029). They are more intrigued when 
they can touch and manipulate artifacts and therefore show more interest in what they 
are doing. But “Conversation and Object Manipulation Influence Children’s Learning in a 
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Museum,” by Jant, Haden, Uttal, and Babcock (2014), also states that interaction with 
objects alone does not lead to overall comprehension and retention of knowledge.  
In this study, the authors asked 78 parent and child pairs to visit the 
Southwestern Pueblo and Plaza and the Pawnee Earth Lodge to investigate how 
children learned. The participants were split into 4 groups: a control group that was 
given nothing to assist their museum experience; a group that was given cards with wh-
questions to enhance conversation about six target objects in the museum; a group that 
was given objects to assist interaction with and interest in the museum; and a group that 
was given wh-question cards and objects to foster understanding of the museum (Jant 
et al 2014).  
The study found that more “elaborative-talk” conversations occurred between the 
parents and children with wh-question cards, whether or not the children had objects. 
Additionally, the most “joint conversation” happened among pairs that received objects, 
with or without cards. Next, the pairs went to another museum to test whether or not the 
connections made, and conversations had, in the first setting would be transferred to a 
new environment. The group found that having a combination of cards and objects led 
more parents and children to discuss the connections between the two museums (Jant 
et al 2014).  
About 50% of the participants also conducted a pre-exhibit activity. They showed 
that this activity before going to the exhibits, in combination with wh-questions, led to 
higher retention of the material over a two week period following the museum visit. This 
is likely because children had an idea of what to expect going into the museum visits 
and then were stimulated by questions leading to discussion. In all, the study found that 
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interaction with objects was not the most important aspect for fostering conversation 
and learning in a museum. Instead, asking questions that lead to discussion of the 
exhibit most enhances the experience (Jant et al 2014).  
Wh-questions focus a child’s attention on aspects of an event that help the 
parent determine what the child does and does not know. Requests for 
names, descriptions, actions, explanations, and so forth, can help a child 
construct a coherent representation of an experience in memory... 
Together asking wh-questions and making associations can increase what 
is learned and how accessible that information is in the future (Jant et al 
2014). 
The study also suspects that receiving similar objects before going to the exhibits may 
have influenced the children to believe the exhibit objects were no longer novel, 
allowing them to talk more freely about the pieces and the experience. “Joint talk in the 
exhibit serves as a chance to augment understanding gained from manipulating objects” 
(Jant et al 2014: 2040) This proved that both interaction with objects and conversation 
lead to a better comprehension (Jant et al 2014).      
Finally, by adding narratives throughout the museum that connect artifacts with 
relatable stories of people, places, or things that non-expert audiences can identify with, 
it is more likely that the audience will understand, be interested in, and retain knowledge 
of their experience — especially when talking about science or technology (Dahlstrom 
2014:13614-13620). This has been proven in “Using narratives and storytelling to 
communicate science with non-expert audiences,” by Michael F. Dahlstrom (2014), 
because “narratives are easier to comprehend and audiences find them more engaging 
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than traditional logical-scientific communication” (Dahlstrom 2014:13614). Because 
narratives offer a familiar format and are more intriguing to the reader, narratives are a 
better way to share technical information with the public (Dahlstrom 2014:13614–
13620). This means more people will read the information given, consider the “wh-
questions” asked, and interact with the museum’s collection to give a well-rounded and 
memorable experience.   
CONCLUSION 
 The connections made between people and things create a compelling story for 
modern visitors. By understanding and displaying the complex history of an artifact 
through wh- questions and narrative, viewers are more likely to make a lasting 
connection with the piece. When similarly woven into the stories of other artifacts in an 
archaeological or museum collection, visitors gain an understanding of the collection as 
a whole. Studying the use-life and cultural biography of mundane or vernacular artifacts 
to build a compelling narrative and exhibition that combines interaction, questions, and 
stories can be an effective public outreach tool, as this project will show. 
  
CHAPTER 4: THE SEA SLED  
 
In 1938, the Vought Company introduced the OS2U “Kingfisher,” called the 
“workhorse of the fleet”: a monofloat seaplane for use on battleships and cruisers as an 
observation plane (USS North Carolina Battleship Commission [NCBC] n.d.:1) (Figure 
15). A Kingfisher prototype was launched first from land on 1 March 1938 and then as a 
floatplane on 19 March in Hartford, Connecticut, near the Vought-Sikorsky factory 
(Darling 2009:3). The XOS2U-1, the first of its kind, was officially turned over to the 
Navy on 2 April 1938. It had a Pratt & Whitney R-985-4 Wasp engine that could reach 
450 horsepower and a two-blade Hamilton Standard propeller, which enabled the craft 
to reach a top speed of 171 miles per hour and to land on water at a speed of 55 miles 
per hour. When the plane was fitted for use on water, the main float was mounted along 
the centerline of the aircraft, with two smaller wing floats, but it could go slightly faster if 
it had traditional landing gear (Doll and Jackson 1972:3–4) (Figure 16). It had one .30-
caliber machine gun fixed to fire straight ahead, another in the rear that could fire in an 
arc, and the craft could be fitted with two bombs, either 100 or 325 pounds (NCBC 
n.d.:3).  
This aircraft was almost completely constructed of aluminum, with spot-welded 
joints, making it unique for the time period. Spot-welding allowed the aircraft to be 
launched from a catapult and land on the water in any kind of weather without damage 
making it ideal for use on naval vessels (Darling 2009:25). The craft weighed a 
maximum of 6,000 pounds, was 33 ft. 10 in. long, just over 15 ft. tall, and had a wing 
span of 35 ft. 11 in. (NCBC n.d.:3).  
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FIGURE 15. Vought Sikorsky's OS2U Kingfisher (Darling, 2001:10) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 16. OS2U Kingfisher schematics showing landing gear configurations (Bell 2010:50) 
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The Navy granted Vought a contract for 54 aircraft on 20 May 1939 (Darling 
2009:4). Of these 54 craft, 49 were fitted with floats to be launched from ships (Darling 
2009:5). That meant that each of the Navy’s 15 battleships could be supplied with 3 
aircraft and a few could be kept in reserve.  
The Navy ordered 158 OS2U-2s near the end of 1939. These had slight 
improvements to their design, including a better engine and a bulletproof 50-gallon fuel 
tank. They were later retrofitted with some armor for the crew. Most of these OS2U-2s 
were used for inshore patrol and were launched from land. The rest either replaced the 
original OS2U-1s on battleships or were added to cruisers (Bell 2010:2). In 1940, the 
Navy made their final order of 1306 Kingfishers: 300 of these were OS2UN-1s, the rest 
were OS2U-3 models. These, again, had slightly improved engines and most were not 
used for ships (Bell 2010:3). Overall, Kingfishers were used with great success in the 
Pacific theater. The aircraft were mostly used for observation, as well as for 
reconnaissance, target practice, anti-submarine patrols, and for water rescues of 
downed pilots (NCBC n.d.:1).  
Three Kingfishers were designated for USS North Carolina, but had not been 
placed onboard prior to sea trials (NCBC n.d.:13). “…[T]hey were over at Floyd Bennett, 
and the original aviation unit had gone ahead and formed over there, until we ran our 
test and so forth on our catapults” (Tucker 1975:2). The planes were added to the ship 
about a month after it was commissioned, between 10 and 15 May 1942 (NCBC 
n.d.:13). And they were flown often: 
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On one of USS North Carolina’s first assignments, the aircraft flew 
approximately a hundred and seventy-seven hours a month per plane or 
five point eight eight hours per day for thirty days… Now there is no way 
that we could prove this. But neither has it ever been challenged. Because 
every log of every ship that had an aviation unit would have to be 
scrutinized to get the exact figures. But to the best of my knowledge, we 
have never been able to find another ship that was called upon to conduct 
so many flying hours in any one month. I think this is some sort of record 
and I think it would stand…(Tucker 1975:5). 
 “The USS North Carolina’s aviation unit consisted of three OS2U Kingfishers, 
five aviators, and twenty-one enlisted men to maintain these, which sounds like you are 
overloaded with personnel. This wasn’t true” (Tucker 1975:5). Launching a Kingfisher 
took a crew of mechanics, riggers, a deck crew, a catapult crew, and a communications 
crew all under the launching officer, as well as the pilot and gunner. Before the craft 
could be launched, it had to be mounted to the catapult, thoroughly inspected, and then 
the pilot, the catapult crew, and the communications crew would go through a series of 
hand-signals to ensure that the craft and the bridge were ready for the launch (Doll and 
Jackson 1972:3–4). 
North Carolina had two 68-foot catapults installed on the stern of the ship (Figure 
17). These could fire a Kingfisher from its cradle at approximately 65–70 miles per hour 
(Figure 18). This was accomplished by setting off “a powder charge similar to that for a 
5-inch gun” while the plane’s engine was running at its top speed (NCBC n.d.:2).  
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FIGURE 17. Storage of three OS2U Kingfishers on BB-55 aft deck (U.S. Navy 1942) 
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FIGURE 18. Kingfisher being catapulted from the deck of a battleship (Darling 2001:52) 
 
 These planes were intended for reconnaissance only, but proved useful in 
several other capacities, including target practice, “at times the planes would be used 
for target practice and we’d take them up and fly around and then the ships would 
simulate firing at us for their gunnery practice” (Sisco 1975:2-3); rescue of downed 
pilots; and even antisubmarine patrols, as they could be equipped with two bombs 
(Tucker 1975:5). This made them valuable past their intended use, which was important 
as the advent and improvement of radar made them less useful for reconnaissance.  
From a practical point of view, I think they [Kingfishers] were damned near 
worthless. We had one exception, say like going into Utithi; we could get 
up in the planes. I went up with the aviator and looked out for penacles 
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[sic] that had nailed the South Dakota going into Noumea and helped 
guide the ship in. But we got in an awful mess that particular time, 
because Mr. Lowdle, the pilot had signed this paper that all the radios 
were wired and taped, only to land at the Iowa where Admiral Hustvedt 
was and went aboard and got some fuel and the like, tried our bombs, and 
they didn’t work. We identified the damage to the other ships like the 
Indiana and Minnesota, and we also told about the number of battleships, 
cruisers and destroyers in the harbor. When we got back to the ship, we 
found that the whole thing was on the air. After trying to keep all of this 
secret, to have something like this happen would just make you sick. I was 
sick that we were involved in such a thing as that. I think that the planes 
were about twenty times as much of a nuisance as they were a value. 
They were always in the way. They had to be off loaded every time you 
fired the main batteries, and then picking them up was always a chore. We 
would spend a lot of time, and also we would expose our ship to the 
possibility of being torpedoed in the operation of recovering those planes. I 
believe there again we had a carry-over from the old Navy to this 
particular Navy, whereas especially when we had our radar spotting 
ability, we could damned near see where each shell landed. I can’t 
remember an aircraft being at all capable in spotting (Kirkpatrick 1975:19–
20). 
“Charlie” recovery of the plane, also called “cast pickup,” was likely the most 
difficult part of the operation, especially if there was any sea chop (Doll and Jackson 
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2010:6). Unfortunately, planes were liable to capsize if faced with any incoming waves 
(Darling 2009:58) (Figure 19). Fay Wasson, a seaman who joined North Carolina’s crew 
in 1944, was manning one of the forty-millimeter guns on the fantail during one such 
event (Wasson 1975:1): 
Well, the Kingfisher had just come back from his mission. I don’t know 
what mission it was on, very important though, and the net was out and he 
flew in and on the net. As the cable was coming down for him to hook it to 
his aircraft to be lifted up, just before it reached his hand, the ocean just 
swallowed him… Disappeared, no pilot, aircraft never found (Wasson 
1975:3). 
 
FIGURE 19. Kingfisher in trouble during landing (Darling 2001:67) 
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To recover a plane, a sea sled was connected to the port or starboard crane on 
the stern. This sled, mainly consisting of a cargo net, was intended to hook the plane’s 
main float and hung over the side of the ship (Figure 20). To even make the recovery 
possible, several maneuvers were necessary. The ship had to turn at a 45-degree angle 
to the wind, creating a smooth water surface, or “slick”, that the plane could attempt to 
land on. Then, the plane would land as close to the ship as possible so that the pilot 
could taxi onto the sea sled. A pawl, attached to the main float, then hooked to the 
cargo netting on the sled, allowing the pilot the opportunity to turn off the aircraft’s 
engine. This meant that the aircraft was being towed by the ship. The radioman/gunner 
would then climb out of the aircraft, as a hoisting sling from the crane was lowered, and 
would attach the sling to the aircraft (Figures 21, 22).  
 
FIGURE 20. Recovery diagram for Kingfisher float plane from the Illustrated Seaman (1945) 
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FIGURE 21. Kingfisher attached to sea sled and being lifted by crane (Darling 2001: 57) 
 
FIGURE 22. The Illustrated Seaman’s (1945) diagram to recover a sea plane 
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Signal flags were used to coordinate the recovery of the plane, which was then 
lifted from the water. All three Kingfishers could be stored on one crane, but two of them 
had to be removed from the catapult before the third could be launched (Doll and 
Jackson 2010:3–5). More likely, the plane would be stored in one of the cradles, one on 
either catapult and one on the aft deck (NCBC n.d.:4). 
While the Kingfisher is a well-documented artifact from North Carolina and other 
World War II ships, the sea sled is much less studied because it was a utilitarian object 
used as support for the aircraft (Figure 23). Because the Kingfisher and its recovery 
system were so new to the Navy, several of the crew members saw occasion to 
mention these pieces in their oral accounts: 
 
FIGURE 23. Kingfisher lifted from sea sled (U.S. Navy 1943) 
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I remember on the fantail they had two OSU-2 [sic] planes, airplanes. 
They would land when they would come in from flight operations, they 
would land in the water and taxi up behind the stern of the ship. We would 
swing the cranes out, I believe the 6th Division took care of this, and pick 
them up out of the water and put them on their catapults. We’d fire off 
theses catapults with some kind of powder charge. They would use the 
planes for spotting the sixteen-inch guns. They would give back radio 
reports of where the shells were hitting at, exploding at, how close they 
were to the target (Goad 1975:8–9). 
The North Carolina Memorial has a sea sled in their collection and, although it 
has deteriorated, the artifact can still help tell the larger story of the Kingfisher and North 
Carolina’s operations. When examined, it was housed in a deteriorating canvas sack, 
coated in a yellow polymer/plastic/paint that was tied around the artifact. The rope 
netting, which would have acted as the catch for the floatplane’s hook, was mostly 
intact. The buffer, or head piece, which would have hung over the side to connect the 
plan to the ship’s catapults by cable, was rusted and the padding inside it was falling 
from the seams. The associated cables were wrapped around the yellow canvas sack 
(Figures 24, 25).  
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FIGURE 24. Sled's main body (Author 2013) 
 
FIGURE 25. USS North Carolina’s sea sled and associated artifacts (Author 2013) 
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 The yellow-painted canvas sack had clear damage from salt crystal formation. 
The crystals made the sack brittle and had caused several pieces of the sack to detach 
from the main sack mass (Figure 26). Stress to the sack had also caused rips to 
develop. Metal grommets were historically used to lace the sack around the sea sled 
and stress to these areas caused the laces to unravel and the canvas sack to rip from 
the grommets in several areas (Figure 27). The cables wrapped around the canvas 
sack and artifact also caused stress and resulted in several areas of deterioration 
(Figure 28). There is no explained use for this sack in the Illustrated Seaman (1945), a 
manual that tells exactly how to recover the Kingfisher planes, or in crew oral accounts. 
This could simply be a historic or current method to store the sled in a compact way. 
The yellow paint on the canvas sack could be a fireproofing agent, which is mentioned 
in one interview.  
 
FIGURE 26. Stress has caused the canvas sack to tear (Author 2013) 
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FIGURE 27. The lacing has caused the sack to come apart (Author 2013) 
 
FIGURE 28. The cables pictured were wrapped around the center of the sled causing heavy deterioration to the area (Author 
2013) 
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 The sea sled’s rope netting was rolled around the buffer support beam (Figure 
29). This likely caused stress to both the netting and the beam, but the netting was still 
mostly intact even though it was starting to fray and salt crystal formation could clearly 
be seen in between the fibers. This part of the artifact constitutes an 8x10-foot area with 
10x10-inch squares in the netting (Figure 24). 
 
FIGURE 29. The ropes unwrapped from the head support (Author 2013) 
 
 The support beam consists of canvas sewn around an iron bar and packed with 
fibrous masses as a sort of cushion. The ends are capped in leather (Figure 30), but the 
threads connecting the leather to the canvas, and enclosing the canvas to itself, were 
deteriorating to the point that packing was falling out of the object and the corroded iron 
bar was partially exposed (Figure 31). The iron bar was clearly corroded near each end, 
but it was impossible to see its condition on the interior of the canvas bag and packing. 
Metal eyes extrude from the canvas sack in three locations so that cables could be 
attached to the support beam to connect to the ship’s cranes during the piece's use-life 
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(Figure 32). The iron support beam and eyes were in a semi-stable condition, even 
though they were corroded.  
 
FIGURE 30. Leather end cap of the head support (Author 2013) 
 
FIGURE 31. Corroded metal rod inside the support beam (Author 2013) 
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FIGURE 32. Metal eye on the sea sled’s support beam for attachment of a cable to the ship’s crane (Author 2013) 
 
This sea sled is not the same as all of those seen in historic images. Perhaps, 
the differences, mainly in the support bar design, happened over the course of the war 
as the recovery device was repaired or improved. Because the Kingfisher was such a 
new technology, so too was its launch and recovery system. These design variations 
add knowledge, however small, to the sailor’s stories and the known history of the sea 
sled and the Kingfisher plane. The sea sled must have had several designs, as seen in 
photographs of other sea sleds and as shown in the Illustrated Seaman (1945) (Figures 
20, 24, and 33). 
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FIGURE 33. Sea sled with a variation to head support (Pacific Aviation Museum: Pearl Harbor 2016) 
 
This could have been an effort to improve the sea sled’s stability, in hopes that 
the planes would not capsize during landing and recovery. It may have been an effort to 
save materials and time in manufacture as the war continued, using smaller cargo 
netting and less canvas and paint for the support beam. It could also have been an 
effort to make recovery less complicated with fewer materials. Or perhaps it was a 
combination of any or all of these or other possibilities.  
We are lucky enough to have oral and traditional histories of the Kingfisher sea 
sleds, because of its technological novelty at the time. While this artifact became 
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mundane — through its mass production, use, and utilitarian purpose — the idea was 
novel when it was introduced to North Carolina. 
The piece’s use-life is documented, but a description of the storage conditions for 
this piece are missing. Whether or not the yellow painted canvas bag was originally 
designed for the sea sled’s storage, or not, it has become part of the artifact — and its 
history — now. Questions arise, such as: was the bag historically attached to the 
support beam on the sea sled? Perhaps it was intended to act as a bright yellow marker 
for the Kingfisher pilots to taxi toward; but no attachment points could be found. There 
obviously would have been a need to store the sea sled, and rolling the netting around 
the support beam to place the piece in a container seems a logical move. Additionally, 
sailors recounted that even their bedding and belonging had to be wrapped in 
something fireproofed. Chemical analysis of the yellow paint may reveal the fire-
retardant properties of the bag. It is also possible that the yellow painted canvas bag 
became the storage solution for the sea sled after its wartime use-life as part of its 
museum use-life.  
Because storage of the sea sled is not mentioned in the fragmented histories of 
the artifact, the answer may never be known. The yellow canvas bag’s similar 
deterioration to the sea sled suggests that the two were used congruently. The bag’s 
canvas is splitting apart because of salt crystallization, similar to the rope and canvas of 
the sea sled.  
It is highly unlikely that the USS North Carolina Memorial ever put either of these 
pieces in water, so salt crystal formations are probably from the artifact’s World War II 
life. The similarity of bag and object deterioration then suggests that the bag was 
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storage for, or was at least somehow connected to, the sea sled during its wartime use 
and that the salt crystals are from the bag being dragged through the water, from the 
sled being put away wet, or from crystal transfer and expansion over many years.  
While the sea sled is a mundane artifact, it was, and has continued to be, well 
taken care of by the museum. Organics, like textiles and rope, are highly susceptible to 
water damage, especially from an ocean environment. Given its 74-year life, this mostly 
organic artifact is in fairly good condition. We know that it was submerged and dried in 
the heat and humidity of the Pacific many times during World War II, as it was put in the 
water anytime a Kingfisher needed to be recovered. We also know that the artifact was 
displayed on North Carolina’s deck for at least a brief period during the Memorial’s 
approximately 50-year life.  
Sunlight, and the already present salt crystals, has undoubtedly caused damage 
to this artifact. While display and storage could theoretically be the sole causes of 
damage to the painted canvas sack and sea sled, it is highly unlikely that such a 
utilitarian artifact was thoroughly cleaned of salt crystals during its wartime life, making it 
likely that the damage seen today is, in fact, at least partially because of its use.  
Conversely, having such a utilitarian object survive until the present shows that it 
has been decently cared for throughout its life. It is clear the museum sees enough 
cultural, or technological, value in the piece to briefly display it and to continue to store 
it. It can also be said that the sailors were not actively destroying the piece and that they 
likely took care of the sled and valued it for its use in the recovery of the monetarily, 
technologically, and perhaps culturally valuable Kingfishers.  
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I want to give our Air Force credit for the work that they did because most 
of the time the planes had been spotted and they had been shot down by 
our interception. Our planes themselves were secure from general battle 
quarters. We had already run up and come down hundreds of times and 
after a while you get to where you want to see some action, you want to 
start being a part of the war (Jones 1975:9). 
Mundane as it was, the Kingfisher sea sled made the recovery of the aircraft and their 
crews possible. Without the sled, Kingfisher flights at sea would have been impractical, 
showing that a seemingly simple technology can be valued for its utilitarian purpose.   
  
CHAPTER 5: THE PLOTTING BOARD 
 
Like the Kingfisher, radar was a newly invented system when USS North 
Carolina was put into commission:  
When we left the shipyard in New York, we had no radar. We had just 
everything that made a big battleship go that was not often all the way 
there. At any rate when we actually sailed from New York and went up to 
Casco Bay and we got radar on the ship, everything just fell into place. 
From then on, we had no major problems until we got out into the Pacific 
(Banquet Comments 1975:26). 
Radar was first installed on the destroyer USS Leary in 1937. Only seven other 
ships received the technology by 1940. “I guess that the first of the radars that were put 
on big ships were on the Washington and the North Carolina” (Ward 1975:3). While 
some ships were being retrofitted with radar, many only received systems when they 
were overhauled or during their construction. Development of radar was so rapid that, 
within a year and a half of its installation, a system could become obsolete (Blee 
1982:30).  
The technology gave officers on North Carolina an improved range of vision, but 
at first the system was not an effective tool:  
We had a radar — a big bed spring up there. It would show you that there 
was land somewhere ahead of you perhaps; but you couldn’t tell how far; 
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and you couldn’t tell where the limits of it were. We couldn’t use that at all 
(Stryker 1975:6). 
“Bedspring,” or CXAM radar units, nicknamed because of the shape of its 
antenna, were not reliable (Blee 1982:28) (Figure 34). In fact, USS Raven, a 
minesweeper, was so worried about North Carolina’s radar system that the escort lured 
a German submarine away from the battleship on the way to Casco Bay (Banquet 
Comments 1975:25). 
 
FIGURE 34. CXAM radar antenna on USS Yorktown (U.S. Navy 1942) 
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I knew that the North Carolina had a big radar that wasn’t worth a damn, a 
CXAM. They couldn’t pick up a ship to save their life. I thought that ship 
was going to be charging around there and wouldn’t know where I was, so 
I turned on my lights so he wouldn’t hit me. I just wanted to let you know 
that if you were on board then, people thought that I was ordered to that 
ship later on because I was such a hero – that I took the submarine away 
from them (Banquet Comments 1975:26). 
Shortly after commissioning, A. G. Ward, a future Admiral who had trained at MIT 
in the Navy’s new radar, fire control, and computing systems, realized that the system 
on North Carolina and its sister ship, Washington, was faulty: 
The people in the Bureau of Ships that made these [radar] systems made 
a mistake; and we didn’t know this when we went out, because our radar 
was not supposed to be turned on except when we were pretty far out 
because of the fear of someone else getting notice of it. When we got out, 
ours didn’t work very well. Something else that didn’t work very well was 
the gun control system. Something was wrong with it. I went around one 
day, and Joe Stryker was with me. Joe didn’t have quite the technical 
background that I had, but we went down there and worked together with 
the fire control technicians and found out that one of the wires in the 
controlling antenna was crossed. The system wouldn’t work. It wasn’t any 
good until somebody did something about it. They had to take one wire off 
one little screw and put it over here on this little screw. Nobody in the ship 
knew anything about it, so I stuck my face into it; and I worked a week, 
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because it was an enormous maze of wires. Finally I got it so that I figured 
that it was right. It made it possible the detection of things that were out 
there. Without this little thing, it wouldn’t work. I sent a message off to Ed 
Hooper on the Washington via that commanding officer on the North 
Carolina and the Bureau of Ordinance that it worked fine. We were going 
through the Panama Canal when we finally got the thing so it would work 
all right (Ward 1975:4). 
More radar was added to the ship while it was repaired in Pearl Harbor after it 
was torpedoed in September 1942 (Ward 1975:9). Two new systems were installed to 
allow North Carolina to better detect incoming air attacks. Search radar was controlled 
through the Combat Information Center (CIC) and was used to detect incoming planes 
and ships up to 130 miles away. To accomplish this, a SK-2 antenna and two SG 
systems emitted a broad, high beam 360 degrees around the ship to get a clear, 
continuous picture of the ship’s surroundings. Additionally, the ship had six fire control 
radar systems. These had a narrower beam and were only moved to track incoming 
craft, to aim, and to fire (Blee 1982:29–31). But none of the systems were perfect: 
You just stood at your battle station and hoped everything would work out. 
We were getting all these reports on radar about all these bogeys coming, 
and the radar was fairly elementary in those days. What would happen, 
the strike group from the Japs were coming in, and all of a sudden they 
would be lost. They would say, “No more bogeys on the screen.” What 
was happening was that they were in one of these null areas… (Resen 
1975:7). 
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The kinks in this technology did not go unnoticed by the enemy: 
Right, at this particular time it seemed that the Japanese found out that 
our weak spot in the radar system was coming in low on the surface of the 
water with their biddy [sic] torpedo planes…so in order to be ready for 
them in this respect we went to general quarters which is when everybody 
manned their battle stations. We did this before dark each night and 
before daylight each morning because this was the time they picked to 
approach us in this direction. We handled them pretty well by doing that… 
(Jones 1975:3). 
To identify incoming friendly planes from enemy craft, the U.S. Navy developed a 
test known as “IFF,” or Identification: Friendly or Foe. This was an electronic 
transmission to which the enemy planes did not know how to respond (Blee 1982:29). 
To make detection and identification more difficult, enemy pilots who were able to get 
close to the Task Force could confuse the radar systems:  
A lot of time we had general quarters, and we stayed in general quarters a 
lot. What would happen, the Japs were pretty smart. What they would do, 
they would have a plane fly by the task force, especially when we were in 
task force 58. They would have a single plane come down through the 
task force way off, and this is the word I got, of course. I’m pretty sure it is 
accurate, too. They would drop these streamers of tin foil, and it would run 
radar crazy. Every streamer would be a potential plane. They would keep 
us up two or three days like this. You’d be at general quarters because 
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there was always bogies on the screen…Once you let your guard down, 
that’s when they really hit you, you see. (Horton 1975:7). 
Even when enemy vessels were being closely monitored and tracked, radar did 
not always prevent attack: 
One of the reasons the Gwin was sunk was because in that particular 
action that night, the Japanese destroyers had shot most of their 
torpedoes against our task group and had retired over the horizon. We 
had sent two or three of our destroyers after them. About half or three 
quarters of an hour later, some ships were returning over the horizon on 
the same bearing that our destroyers had gone out. Because our radar in 
the early part of the war was not so sensitive or good we were unable to 
determine if these were enemy — it was dark, about two or three o’clock 
in the morning — or whether they were our own ships returning to join the 
task force…(Wenck 1975:8). 
The main way incoming ships, submarines, and airplanes were tracked was 
through the use of plotting boards throughout the ship. The plot information was 
provided by improving radar systems as well as by observation planes, fighter pilots, 
and other ships in the task force (Blee 1982:32). Often pilots were directed to other, 
potentially enemy, craft to identify the “bogie” as friend or foe. “Successful interception 
was announced by the code world, ‘Tallyho!’. If identified as enemy…the bogies 
became ‘bandits’…A shootdown was announced by the word ‘splash’” (Blee 1982:32).  
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Likely the most crucial plotting location was the Combat Information Center 
(CIC). Here, crew would look at radar readings, would listen to communications from 
other stations around the task force and in the air, and would talk with friendly ships to 
plot enemy craft. Plots would project the enemy’s movement and CIC would share 
these activities with those crew on the bridge, who would decide what the ship was to 
do next:  
Now you have got to remember that the fighter director’s job was not a job 
necessarily with the guns. His job was working with the aircraft of the 
carriers and any airborne combat air patrol. And also I was inboard, the 
Combat Information Center was inboard, so that I was very rarely at a 
point where I could see anything happening… My role in almost every 
case was in handling the raids coming in, assigning raids to our men so 
that we could follow the raids and know exactly where they were, and 
piping that information up to the Captain over one set of phones that I 
would have. In the other set of phones I would be in touch with the other 
fighter directors of the force that we were with — they may be carrier 
fighter directors or battleship fighter director or cruiser fighter directors — 
for a complete exchange of information as to where or why (Wenck 
1975:10). 
 CIC worked very closely with the ship’s Kingfishers and with fighter pilots in the 
task force via a short-range tactical radio, called “TBS” (short for “talk between ships”) to 
track observed threats on the water and in the air. They also worked closely with other 
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ships to determine threats and to share information throughout the task force (Blee 
1982:32).  
In particular I remember one incident that took place with the bombing of 
the Franklin, which was our biggest and newest carrier, during an air raid. 
If you recall, she had a tremendous loss of personnel and officers. We 
were the only ship that had this bogey coming in. All the other ships had 
nothing but friendlies returning to the carriers. We were in a carrier group 
at that time. I called the Franklin and told them that I had a bogey and I 
heard no other reports of a bogey and could they confirm that. The fighter 
director there questioned a lot of the other ships and nobody had a bogey. 
It was a freak of the radar, because it was a well-known trick of the 
Japanese. They would slip a plane in somewhere with a returning group, 
that doesn’t mean right in the middle of them where they could be visually 
seen but close enough so that the returning group appearing on the radar 
scope showed nothing but IFF, friendly… It was a direct hit, and she 
caught on fire from one end to the other. She lost hundreds of men. It was 
absolutely terrible (Sneck 1975:10–11). 
Like the Kingfisher and the Kingfisher recovery sled, radar and plotting boards 
are mentioned fairly often in crew oral histories. This is likely because of the novelty of 
the technology. Therefore, radar is mentioned specifically, whereas plotting boards are 
not. This proves how mundane plotting boards were; their supportive role was so simple 
and utilitarian that they were not even mentioned alongside the more sophisticated 
radar systems. 
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 The main plotting board used in North Carolina’s CIC was a vertically mounted, 
round acrylic, or Plexiglas, piece, 55-inches in diameter. To this day, it is set in a metal 
frame, creating a transparent wall that separates the main part of the room from the 
drawing face of the board. On the back side of the board, one or two men would plot 
enemy craft. These men would listen to sound-powered head phones and draw 
backwards symbols, numbers, and letters to denote incoming enemy craft on the board. 
This allowed other men, namely officers, in the main portion of the room to observe the 
plots without having the plotters blocking their line of sight (Figure 34). 
 
FIGURE 35. CIC’s vertical plotting board (Author 2014) 
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 As radar improved, there was a need to plot enemy craft further and further 
away. The vertical plot in CIC was only designed to show points up to 80 miles away. 
This is evident by the stamped rings and numbers designating so many miles. The 
crew, however, modified the board by adding hand drawn bands to the outer limits of 
the space allowing craft to be tracked up to 180 miles away (Figure 35). This is a clear 
representation of the rapid improvement of radar technology at the time. It was 
impractical and/or inconvenient to replace the vertical plotting board as quickly as radar 
improved, so the men modified the board by designating further distances.    
 
FIGURE 36. Differentiation of interior section, which plots up to 80 miles, and exterior section, which plots up to 180 miles 
(Author 2014) 
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 When examined, the board had been continuously used over the years as was 
evident by the fading paint on the surface. Even today, the board is used for 
demonstrative purposes. This continual use eroded much of the stamped and painted 
distance and location markings. As part of this thesis, the board was restored as close 
to its original condition as possible and a Plexiglas cover was added to the board’s 
façade so that the restored surface will not be worn away again (Figure 37). This way, 
the board can continue its life as a historical, interpretive artifact. Now, interpreters draw 
on the Plexiglas cover, instead of on the original surface, protecting the surface, but still 
allowing visitors to experience the artifact’s use. 
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FIGURE 37. The plotting board before and after cleaning (above) and after restoration (below) (Author 2014) 
  
CHAPTER 6: THE LITTER 
 
Unlike the sea sled and the plotting board, stretchers are rarely talked about in 
North Carolina’s oral histories, even though related artifacts and spaces are discussed. 
Stretchers, also called litters, are related to the sickbay, which is only talked about 
anecdotally in the sailor accounts. Edward Cope, for example, talks of waking the duty 
doctor in the middle of the night because a drunk marine sleeping on the top bunk 
vomited on the bunkers below him (Cope 1975:3). Jerry Gonzales remembers being 
sent to sickbay because: 
I fell with a big old bag of laundry... I had a big swelled up bruise on my left 
leg. I went up there and they drug me to sickbay. Someone said "this man 
just fell off a ladder." I don’t want to use no profane language but they 
said, "you get that SOB out of here. This is a field day and we got 
captain’s inspection tomorrow. Bring him back Monday…" Now we laugh 
about little things like that. After all, I lived, so I don’t think it was too bad 
(Gonzales 1975:6–7). 
The anecdotes may be more prevalent because talking about injury and death is 
difficult, and bringing levity to those memories helps people cope. When death is 
mentioned in the North Carolina accounts, it is almost always done briefly and without 
much detail, like the explanation below.  
He was in that washroom and he was killed. The other four men were in a 
compartment and when they took their bodies out all their hair was burned 
off. One man on topside was blown overboard. Never found. That was 
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only a small horror of war. There are plenty of horrible stories that go on 
(Newmann 1975:10). 
 Getting to sickbay was not an easy journey either, especially when carrying an 
injured sailor: 
Fox and George L. Saffron carefully laid the trailing parts of the boy’s 
anatomy on his stomach and picked him up. One grabbed him under is 
shoulders, while the other slipped between his legs and lifted then into his 
arms. They carried him gingerly and started down the many levels toward 
sick bay. Scaling the first few levels of the superstructure was difficult, 
maneuvering the critically injured boy through the crowd of panicked and 
stricken sailors and down several flights of stairs, his feet bumping against 
the metal handrail on each side regardless of how careful his rescuers were. 
But as they entered the main deck hatch to go below, the stairways 
narrowed and steepened… (Ramsey 2003:284). 
To assist in carriage of an injured man, stretchers were built to specification for 
their intended location. The War Department (1945) described military stretchers in use 
at the time in field manual FM 8-35: Transportation of the Sick and Wounded. The 1945 
publication classifies a litter as “a device capable of being carried by two or more 
bearers for the purpose of transporting sick, injured, or dead persons” (War Department 
1945:34).  
There were eight types of military litters in use at this time: straight aluminum 
litter (Figure 38); folding aluminum litter (Figure 39); straight wood litter (Figure 40); 
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folding wood litter (Figure 41); straight steel litter (Figure 42); metal airplane litter, also 
called a Stokes litter (Figure 43); ambulance cot litter, or Bomgardner type (Figure 44); 
and semirigid canvas litter (Figure 45) (War Department 1945:36–51). “These types 
have been adopted because of availability of certain materials to the manufacturers, 
and the necessity of designing special litters to meet special situations” (War 
Department 1945:35). This statement ambiguously encompasses and legitimizes any 
variations of the eight stretcher. The semirigid canvas litter and the Stokes litter were 
the two most commonly used in the Navy (War Department 1945:47–51).  
 
 
FIGURE 38. Aluminium litter (WW2 US Medical Research Centre 2017) 
 
FIGURE 39. Folding aluminium litter (WW2 US Medical Research Centre 2017) 
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FIGURE 40. Wooden litter (WW2 US Medical Research Centre 2017) 
 
FIGURE 41. Folding wooden litter (WW2 US Medical Research Centre 2017) 
 
FIGURE 42. Steel litter (WW2 US Medical Research Centre 2017) 
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FIGURE 43. Stokes litter (WW2 US Medical Research Centre 2017) 
 
FIGURE 44. Ambulance cot litter (WW2 US Medical Research Centre 2017) 
87 
 
 
FIGURE 45. Semirigid canvas litter (WW2 US Medical Research Centre 2017) 
 
The North Carolina example studied is a canvas construction with wooden 
supports. Additionally, ten canvas straps are sewn to the stretcher to wrap around the 
patient’s body and were secured with metal clips on the opposite side of the litter. 
Indiscriminate pencil markings are still visible in several areas and the piece is stained 
with years of dust and grime as well as potential bodily fluids and tar (Figure 46). 
The litter has a triangular head piece with a ring at the top, potentially to facilitate 
carriage, and a strap that secured the patient’s head to the litter. The section that 
supports the patient’s core has a squared flap on either side of the main mass that 
could be folded over the patient and two straps that could be secured to metal clips 
around the flaps to ensure that, regardless of swinging, or flipping, the patient would not 
fall out of the litter. 
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FIGURE 46. USS North Carolina’s stretcher showing the securing straps, wooden wedges and pockets, and hand holds (Author 
2013) 
 
Additionally, the litter has separate supports for each of the patient’s legs. These, 
too, each have three straps that secured the legs to the stretcher, while a seventh strap 
is located on the left leg that apparently secured the two legs together. There are also 
six hand holds, two at the shoulders, two at the hips, and one on the end of each leg 
support (Figure 47). These were likely to facilitate four- or six-man carriage of the 
stretcher (War Department 1945:51). On the litter’s reverse, there is a ring attached to 
the right and left of the core section (Figure 48). These could have been to attach the 
folded litter to a pack or to attach the litter to a Stokes basket, perhaps.  
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FIGURE 47. Stretcher; arrows point to the six hand holds (Author 2013) 
 
 
FIGURE 48. Folded stretcher; notice two rings (Author 2013) 
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The litter folds into a 2 ft. by 1.5 ft. square, making it extremely portable (Figure 
49). The core section and the leg supports have wooden wedges that fit neatly into six 
sewn pockets on the reverse of the object to give the litter a stiffness; it is otherwise a 
flexible construction (Figure 50). These small wooden wedges also ensure that the 
construction is very lightweight, as compared to a stretcher made completely of wooden 
boards, for example.  
 
 
FIGURE 49. Stretcher shown in the folded position (Author 2013) 
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FIGURE 50. Stretcher; arrows point to the six support pockets (Author 2013) 
 
While the North Carolina example fits the War Department’s definition and 
requirements of a military litter (Table 1), it does not exactly match any of the stretchers 
shown in the manual (War Department 1945:36–51).  
TABLE 1. Specifications for a military litter (War Department 1945:34–35) 
Requisites of Military Litters. For satisfactory employment in the military service, a 
litter should fulfill the following requirements: 
A. Size 
The size of the litter must be sufficient to accommodate 
individuals whose height and weight are within the 
maximum limits as prescribed by the Department. 
B. Weight 
The weight should be as light as possible without 
sacrificing necessary strength and durability. 
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C. Durability 
The durability should be sufficient to withstand the 
rough usage encountered in prolonged field operation. 
D. Type 
It is desirable that the litter be collapsible in at least one 
axis to facilitate handling, storage, and movement to 
the point of use. 
E. Standardization 
It is also desirable that all litters be the same 
dimensions when open. This allows the patient to pass 
through the various echelons of medical service without 
being removed from the litter upon which he is 
originally placed, even though the evacuation journey 
involves the use of several different types of carriers. 
Such standardization will result in the saving of 
valuable time and obviate the danger to the patient 
resulting from changing litters. Standardization is highly 
desirable not only throughout the military service but 
also between the military and naval services to 
facilitate evacuation during joint operations. 
 
Most likely, the North Carolina litter is a variation of the semirigid canvas litter. 
This category is very broad. Though the specifications indicate that semirigid litters 
should have four hand-holds to facilitate four-man carriage and four loops in which to 
insert carrying poles, it is possible that this construction differs because it was intended 
for carriage on the steep inclines of the battleship’s stairs and through the ship’s narrow 
hatchways (Table 2). Accessories like litter-carrying straps with hooks could make 
carriage of this specific litter, with its ring on the head piece, possible without poles (War 
Department 1945:111). 
TABLE 2. Specifications for a semirigid canvas litter (War Department 1945:51) 
Specifications: Semirigid Canvas Litter 
Length 72 inches plus 30 inches with straps. 
Width 14 inches. 
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Bed Semirigid canvas; with wooden supports, running vertically. 
Straps 7 securing straps to ties in patient. 
Accessories 
Head piece to support patient’s head. Hand-hold loops; two at 
each end, for four-man carries. Four loops for slipping poles 
through for carrying purposes. 
Advantages 
Patient held securely in position; movement in vertical 
direction is facilitated. Especially useful in evacuating from 
ships and in mountainous areas. 
Remarks 
Designed by Navy Medical Research Institute for use in 
combined operations. 
 
The metal airplane, or Stokes, litter was very popular for naval operations, too 
(War Department 1945:47). The separated leg supports make the North Carolina 
example different from the average semirigid canvas stretcher, but would work well in a 
Stokes litter, which has separate leg compartments (Table 3). While the wooden 
wedges, meant to support the semirigid stretcher, negate the likelihood that this piece 
was solely used with the Stokes litter, its odd construction could indicate its design was 
meant for varied uses. 
TABLE 3. Specifications for a Stokes litter (War Department 1945:47) 
Specifications: Metal Airplane Litter (Stokes) 
Length 7 feet. 
Width 23 inches. 
Depth 8 inches. 
Weight 31 ½ pounds. 
Bed 
Wire mesh netting, supported in a rigid frame of steel tubing. 
Lower half divided into two compartments to accommodate 
legs of patients. 
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Accessories Securing straps at level of chest, thighs (2), and legs. 
Advantages Affords complete security for patient when litter is tilted. 
Remarks Extensively used by Navy; used in joint operations. 
  
This North Carolina stretcher has four areas with pencil markings. Along the 
seam connecting the stretcher’s core and head piece, there is an arrow and a line, 
respectively, pointing to each other (Figure 51). It may be that the line on the head piece 
is also an arrow, but the point is covered by the core section. On the forward side of 
each leg support there is a line drawn along seams toward the top of the construction 
(Figure 52). Additionally, the left and right middle leg straps have a scribble; perhaps an 
“L,” “I,” or “1,” followed by a “-3” written on their front sides (Figure 53).  
It is unlikely that the head piece was added retroactively, as head support would 
have been a necessary design feature. This suggests that these lines are reminiscent of 
the litter’s construction. The lines near the top of the leg supports could point to 
modification, such as repairing a tear or re-supporting the area, but there is no 
indication of any such modification: no fabric was added and no rips are present. 
Finally, the two middle straps could have been retroactively added to the artifact, but 
their attachment to the main artifact matches the attachment style of the other eight 
straps. 
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FIGURE 51. Arrow and line at the seam of the core and head piece of USS North Carolina stretcher (Author 2013) 
 
 
FIGURE 52. Seam lines on the upper portion of USS North Carolina’s stretcher’s legs (Author 2013) 
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FIGURE 53. Markings on the middle straps for the leg supports of USS North Carolina’s stretcher (Author 2013) 
 
Alternatively, on the back of the right leg support there is a design drawn on the 
bottom wooden wedge pocket. The design is approximately half way down the pocket 
and depicts a partial trapezoid with a long thin oval at the top (Figure 54). Unlike the 
other pencil markings, this one does not appear to point directly to the construction of 
the litter, as it does not clearly denote a seam, connection point, component number, 
component shape, or the like. It does not show clear sign of modification either.  
The construction markings could mean that the stretcher was constructed hastily 
before it was sent to the battleship. The creator(s) had plenty of material, the ability to 
put metal caps on the ends of each strap (Figure 55), and embedded a ring at the top of 
the head piece (Figure 56).The solid construction and finished nature of the artifact 
suggest that it was manufactured.  
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If the construction was more of an amalgamation of dissimilar materials, the 
stitching was less precise or poorly finished, or if the straps were not capped, the 
argument might be made that this object was designed and/or constructed onboard the 
ship. It appears, however, that this stretcher was merely hastily manufactured from a 
modified semirigid litter pattern (Figures 44, 45).  
 
FIGURE 54. Markings on the wooden support pocket on the back of USS North Carolina’s stretcher (Author 2013) 
  
98 
 
 
FIGURE 55. Metal caps put on the end of each strap of USS North Carolina’s stretcher (Author 2013) 
 
FIGURE 56. Ring at the top of the head piece on USS North Carolina’s stretcher (Author 2013) 
  
CHAPTER 7: CONNECTING THE SLED, LITTER, AND PLOT WITH THE VISITOR 
 
These three artifacts continue to add metaphorical chapters to their cultural 
biographies even today. Both the sea sled and stretcher are currently housed in 
collections storage. This “chapter” of their lives may be quite dull, but as long as the 
artifacts survive, their biographies continue. Conversely, the plotting board is not only on 
display, but it is continually used in the present. It is now an interpretive tool, instead of 
an integral part of the ship’s radar system, but it is still affecting interpreters' and visitors' 
perceptions of World War II history. 
There are inevitably many options for sharing these artifacts’ histories, but one of 
the singular features of the battleship museum is that, although it has many different 
components, everything was connected and worked together to make it an effective war 
machine. These three seemingly unrelated objects can easily be connected to tell a 
single story. The connection expands their cultural biographies by placing the pieces 
within a broader history instead of focusing on the use-life of a single, or in this case a 
few, artifact(s).  
There are obvious limitations to, and problems with, this particular approach. The 
first and most notable is that these artifacts would have been used and stored 
separately; they would be spread over the aft deck, in CIC, and in the sickbay. These 
stations are dispersed nearly the length of the ship and over several decks. Spatially, 
that makes co-interpretation very difficult. The following story, however, serves as an 
example of a way to re-interpret and connect disparate artifacts. 
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TELLING A SINGLE STORY 
North Carolina played the important role of “home” to the men who served on 
board the ship. Their lifestyle is shared through the bunks, mess, lounge spaces, post 
office, laundry, and other spaces in the battleship museum. The ship was a fighting 
machine, too. Most of the elements onboard North Carolina, like the gun mounts, 
turrets, control rooms, and bridge, were to make the ship an effective war technology. 
The sea sled, plotting board, and litter are mundane objects associated with the latter of 
these tasks; however, they need not be separated from the men’s stories. Take, for 
example, the story of John Burns. 
 Truk was a key Japanese naval base from 1941 to 1943. The atoll consisted of 
six major islands surrounded by a coral reef (Rems 2014:18). Realizing that it was 
vulnerable to attack, Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander of the Japanese Combined 
Forces, moved most of the force away from Truk; but, before the move was complete, 
Task Force 58 — including North Carolina — under the command of Vice Admiral Marc 
Mitscher, was ordered to bombard the island in “Operation Hailstorm” (Rems 2014:17–
18). Throughout 17 and 18 February 1943, 14 Japanese naval ships and 32 supply 
ships carrying almost 200,000 tons of cargo were sunk. Additionally, approximately 270 
Japanese aircraft were destroyed or damaged, leaving only about 100 operational craft. 
Two days later, Koga ordered the remainder of his air fleet off Truk (Rems 2014:20).  
 The atoll was continually bombarded throughout February, March, and April to 
prevent any new supplies from entering. Admiral Nimitz wanted to completely demolish 
Truk’s defenses, so as to render the atoll useless to the Japanese (Rems 2014:19). 
Therefore, he sent Task Force 58 to the island again with orders to finish the 
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destruction, via an air attack. When the U.S. Navy revisited the atoll on 29 April, there 
were approximately 104 operational aircraft and several small naval vessels present 
(Rems 2014:19–20).  
 From a distance of 150 miles, the task force sent 84 Hellcats toward the islands. 
There was heavy cloud cover that morning and Japanese radar was able to spot the 
incoming airplanes. In response, 62 Japanese Zeros were waiting for the incoming 
fighters. Of the 62 Zeros, 59 were shot down. The Hellcats also managed to destroy 34 
planes on the ground, but missed many of the ground defenses because the cloud 
cover prevented clear sight (Rems 2014:19).  
On 30 April, the American Hellcats and bombers returned. In total, only 12 
Japanese airplanes escaped the slaughter and all the above ground defenses, along 
with approximately 20 ships, were destroyed. The task force also bombarded Satawan 
Island and Ponape Island as they left Truk; these attacks were similarly successful 
(Rems 2014:20).  
During the two-day battle, 46 U.S. airmen in 21 planes crashed (Rems 2014:20). 
USS Tang, an American submarine, and several Kingfisher pilots were in charge of the 
rescue of these downed airmen (Figure 56). In one of the most famous American naval 
air rescue stories of World War II, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) John A. Burns, a daring 
North Carolina Kingfisher pilot, saved 10 airmen from the sea and/or from falling into 
Japanese hands off Truk Atoll on 30 April 1943. Tang was responsible for successfully 
saving 12 additional airmen from similar fates throughout the events on 29 and 30 April 
(NCBC n.d.:10). 
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FIGURE 57. USS Tang (U.S. Navy 1943) 
 
Burns had been on North Carolina since he was commissioned after flight 
training in January 1942 (Naval Aviation Museum 2016). He and his Aviation Radioman 
Second Class, Aubrey J. Gill, along with fellow Kingfisher pilot Lt. John J. Dowdle, Jr., 
and his Aviation Radioman Second Class, Robert E. Hill, were catapulted from the 
battleship at about 8 a.m. on 30 April in preparation for spotting and marking downed 
pilots for Tang to rescue (NCBC n.d.:9). When a U.S. fighter was shot down, a radio call 
would go out to both the Kingfishers and Tang with the fighter’s location. This would 
allow the submarine, and the floatplanes, to converge on their point. Since the 
Kingfishers had a better view than the submarine, Dowdle and Burns were to signal 
Tang when they found a fighter (NCBC n.d.:10).  
While Kingfishers were made for observation, they could also be used for rescue 
because they could taxi on the water; so, when Dowdle and Burns found Lt. j.g. Bob 
Kanze in the water, and with Tang nowhere in sight, the Kingfishers decided to retrieve 
the pilot for later transfer to the submarine (Galdorisi and Phillips 2008:78).  
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Dowdle first attempted the rescue. He successfully landed the aircraft on the 
water and taxied over to Kanze, but as Kanze reached out to grab onto one of the wing 
pontoons, a wave took his raft away. A second wave — given the added weight on one 
wing — capsized the aircraft, leaving all three men in the water (Galdorisi and Phillips 
2008:78).  
Careful not to repeat his colleague’s mistake, Burns attempted to rescue the 
three men from the choppy waters. He approached parallel to the waves and was able 
to successfully retrieve all three airmen; two sat on the plane’s wings and the third 
climbed into the cockpit with Radioman Gill. Even one extra body made the Kingfisher 
too heavy to take off, so with the added weight of three men, Burns had to taxi to the 
incoming Tang. He was able to deposit all three airmen on the submarine and took off 
again in search of more downed fighters. Tang shot Dowdle’s capsized floatplane to 
prevent it from being captured by the enemy (Ramsey 2007:210). 
After tagging several airmen in the water over a wide range, Burns had given 
Tang several hours of work. He worried that the submarine would not be able to make it 
to the aid of any other airmen for quite some time, so he decided to rescue Hellcat pilot, 
Lt. j.g. Robert T. Barbor. Burns, Barbor, and Gill sat together for a while, out of the 
range of enemy fire, until two additional bombers went down near their location. Burns 
approached.  
At first, the Kingfisher attempted to tow the two rafts, but the airplane’s attempt to 
taxi further to sea failed because the rafts were swamped. The downed airmen only had 
one choice: to climb on board the Kingfisher. This nearly capsized the plane, but Gill’s 
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quick thinking saved the craft. In the end, seven extra men clung to the floatplane: three 
on each wing and one on the fuselage (Gladorisi and Phillips 2008:80) (Figure 58).  
Tang was busily rescuing other airmen closer to shore and in more dangerous 
water. It took the submarine nearly five hours to return to Burns, Gill, and the seven 
men (Gladorisi and Phillips 2008:80). When the submarine finally returned to retrieve 
the Kingfisher’s load, the plane had been so badly beaten by the waves that the fantail 
of the craft had disappeared beneath the water and the main pontoon was flooded 
(Naval Aviation Museum 2016). 
 
FIGURE 58. Burns' Kingfisher loaded with seven additional men (U.S. National Archives 1944) 
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Burns taxied his craft to the submarine and unloaded the seven airmen. He and 
Gill also boarded Tang, as it was clear their plane would not fly again. Tang’s crew sunk 
the hardworking Kingfisher with their 20-mm gun to keep it from falling into enemy 
hands (Ramsey 2007:212).  
In all, more than half of the downed U.S. airmen from the Truk attacks of 29 and 
30 April were rescued (Figure 59). The 22 men onboard Tang became a temporary 
addition to the submarine’s crew for the trip back to Pearl Harbor (NCBC n.d.:10). From 
there, Burns was offered any station of his choosing (Ramsey 2007:213).  
 
FIGURE 59. Rescued airmen onboard USS Tang (U.S. National Archives 1944) 
He received the Navy Cross in March 1945 for his actions in Truk (NCBC 
n.d.:10). Unfortunately, the heroic Kingfisher pilot was killed stateside in a Hellcat 
training accident on 24 February 1945 (Battleship North Carolina Museum 2016).  
106 
 
Stories like the one of the April attacks on Truk and of the brave Kingfisher pilot 
who saved ten men, give opportunity to share the relationship between pieces of the 
material culture in North Carolina’s collection, namely the Kingfisher sea sled, the 
vertical plotting board, and stretcher(s).  
Kingfishers were popular reconnaissance planes, but they were also very 
valuable for rescue missions because they could fly high, get a wider view of the area, 
and could land on the water to help retrieve any personnel. This made them versatile 
additions to their ships’ complement.  
After something was spotted, they would radio locations of both enemy and 
friendly craft to their ship. The radioed locations would then be plotted on a board, like 
the vertical plot, showing craft even at the periphery of radar’s capabilities. When Burns 
was tagging downed airmen, a radio message of their location was also sent to the 
submarine. They would have had a plotting sheet, if not an actual board, on Tang where 
these airmen’s locations would have been recorded to assist Tang in locating the men 
later.   
Often, if the craft was going to retrieve personnel, as in Burns and Gill’s first 
rescue, the individual would climb in with the radioman in the cockpit. The Kingfisher 
pilot could then taxi the individual to a friendly ship for retrieval. To effectively retrieve 
the Kingfisher, its crew, and any additional persons, its mother-ship would have a sea 
sled lowered into the water for the craft to taxi onto; allowing the aircraft to be lifted by 
crane.  
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Once onboard the ship, any injured men would be transferred to a stretcher and 
taken to sickbay. The advantage of rigid and semi-rigid stretchers, like the one 
discussed in Chapter 6, was obvious as one trekked the steep stairways and tight 
spaces of the battleship North Carolina’s interior. “…As they entered the main deck 
hatch to go below, the stairways narrowed and steepened. Scaling them alone and 
healthy had taken training. Carrying an injured shipmate down them seemed almost 
impossible…” (Ramsey 2007:284). 
These three artifacts, all used for different functions on North Carolina, had to 
work together for a singular purpose. When it came to Kingfisher rescue missions, the 
Kingfisher sea sled, the plot, and the litter played key roles in making the missions 
possible. Connections like this can easily be drawn between many parts of the ship and 
can be backed by artifacts and stories from the ship’s history to enhance the visitor 
experience. 
  
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The history, literature review, case studies, and connections found in the 
previous chapters are meant to show that a few integral, even mundane, artifacts can 
narrate stories like the attack on Truk Atoll and Burns’ daring rescue. Because this 
example tells Burns’ story through three key, mundane artifacts, visitors would 
theoretically leave with a better understanding of a person, the duties, and the 
importance of specific artifacts. In turn, this interprets a broad outline of a battle and the 
ship’s function. By going in depth into the biographies of a few artifacts, a broader story 
emerges without trying to tackle the entire history of the ship or the war. By also 
interspersing wh-questions, like “What role did the [insert artifact here] play in rescuing 
downed fighter pilots?” visitors may learn, discuss, and retain North Carolina’s influence 
as a fighting unit, as a World War II artifact, as it relates to the people who lived 
onboard, and as part of the war’s story.  
BUILDING BIOGRAPHIES 
 Interpreting the complete biography of any one artifact can be quite difficult. 
Tracking details of an object from conception and design through production, original 
use, modification, and reuse to discard and a potential “second life” as part of an 
archaeological collection or a museum display, can prove difficult to impossible. Parts, 
or “chapters,” of an object’s biography, however, present themselves through the study 
of the artifact. With some research, these chapters can start to explain the artifact’s 
history.  
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Study of the stretcher highlighted the presence of manufacturing details. This 
artifact is unlike the common semirigid litter because the leg supports are separated. 
While Field Manual FM-85 (1945) states that variations could exist, the separation 
raised questions over the origin of construction; was this piece constructed onboard the 
ship? The pencil markings also point to speedy creation. While the object could have 
been constructed onboard, it seems unlikely for the following reasons. 
Three of the four groups of pencil markings point to construction as they show 
seams, a joint, and potential component placement. While their existence indicates 
rapid construction, other details, like the similarity of component materials, the presence 
of metal grommets and an inlaid ring, and the quality of the stitching all suggest that the 
piece was, in fact, made professionally. The question is then, why are the leg supports 
separated? Research suggests that this could be a favorable feature onboard a ship so 
that this piece could be used in conjunction with a Stokes litter basket or to make it 
suitable for easy carriage through the steep and narrow passages and stairways.   
 The plotting board featured modification and signs of continual use. As radar 
technology improved throughout the war, it became possible to sight vessels farther and 
farther away. This meant that the vertical plotting board, which could plot up to 80 miles 
away, could not match the distances radar could detect. To improve the plotting board’s 
range, the men likely retrofitted the board so that they could plot up to 180 miles away. 
This was evident by the distinct differentiation between the stamped distance ranges at 
the middle of the board and the hand drawn circles and ranges at the outer edges of the 
board.  
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Continued use could also clearly be seen as the board’s stamped and hand 
drawn ranges were worn away in several areas. This was likely caused by continual 
plotting and erasure of the board’s surface. While all three artifacts show evidence of 
their use, the plotting board is unique in that it has been continually used until this day. 
Even though the artifact’s condition is stable, continued use would have continued to 
deteriorate the original surface. A restoration project was undertaken to restore this 
artifact as close to its wartime condition as possible, and a cover was added to allow 
continued use without new damage to the object’s original surface. This will allow the 
plotting board to continue a new biography “chapter” as an interpretation tool that helps 
visitors understand and comprehend a tangible piece of radar technology’s history.  
Finally, the sea sled shows that utilitarian objects were integral to the success of 
more sophisticated technology, like the Kingfisher. Even a simply designed support tool, 
like netting attached to an iron bar, was necessary to make possible the use of 
something as complicated as a floatplane. Salt water is detrimental to the construction 
materials used in the sea sled, specifically iron, rope netting, and cloth. This means that 
the historic value placed on the sea sled can be seen through its current condition.  
The fact that the sea sled, while fragile, is still mostly intact and in fair condition, 
reveals that this artifact was well taken care over the four years of hard use during the 
war. Crew oral histories suggest that North Carolina’s Kingfishers were used 
continuously and potentially flew more hours than many of their counterparts. If this is 
true, then the sea sled was also in use more often than many of its equivalents. 
Frequent exposure to salt water and hard use of such fragile materials suggest that this 
111 
 
artifact should, likely, not have survived. The crew must have found great value in this 
mundane piece to take such good care of it. 
 These artifacts undoubtedly influenced the men who used them too. Their value 
as resources for integral technologies on the ship surely affected how the men viewed 
these technologies, their ease of use, and therefore life onboard. Because these are all 
mundane artifacts, they were likely overlooked and undervalued when held next to their 
more sophisticated corresponding items. This is corroborated by the lack of stand-alone 
mentions of these artifacts in the crews’ oral histories. While their perceived value may 
have been tied to an integral piece of the ship’s technology, their general stability and 
continued existence in the museum’s collection suggests the mundane pieces were still 
well taken care of and appreciated for their function. 
 Each of these pieces showcases a different segment of its biography. From 
construction, to modification, to value assessed through care taken and current use-life, 
these pieces all interpret aspects of the battleship and the history of World War II. Their 
connection to the battleship’s function is fairly evident. The plotting board assisted radar 
technology. The stretcher facilitated carriage of injured sailors. The sea sled made 
recovery of the Kingfisher possible. These functions can even be tied together through 
historic stories, like that of John Burns. 
Observation planes and plotting crews often worked together. Either Kingfishers 
spotted downed aviators for the plotters to post, or alternatively, plotters located down 
aircraft and direct Kingfishers to their locations. Then, the planes could rescue downed 
pilots and taxi them back to the ship. From there, a sea sled would facilitate the 
aircraft’s recovery before the injured sailor was transferred on a litter to sickbay.  
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More difficult to see are these artifacts’ stories about the larger war effort. The 
stretcher shows hasty construction of, and under documented variation in, wartime 
necessities. The plotting board shows rapid improvements in wartime technology. The 
sea sled shows experimentation in construction techniques and how a relatively simple 
object was necessary to make a much more complex unit work.  
RELATING TO THE PUBLIC 
 People learn through interaction, connection, and discussion. The USS North 
Carolina Battleship Memorial is an immersive and interactive environment. By further 
connecting the artifacts to each other and to relatable, intriguing, stories about people, 
visitors can more easily connect with the stories.  
 Stories like that of Lt. (j.g.) John Burns are compelling because they promote 
empathy. Imposing and impressive artifacts, like the Kingfisher, are likely to gain a 
person’s attention, especially when attached to the story of a relatable person. After 
intriguing the visitor, mundane artifacts can show comprehendible links to other 
locations, technologies, or people. This weaves a web, so to speak, that explains the 
larger unit.  
 More sophisticated technologies or strategies seem less complicated when one 
understands the pieces that make the process possible. Using mundane artifacts, like 
the three in this thesis, simplifies these complex strategies or technologies to their most 
basic elements. Instead of trying to explain a complicated and expansive technology or 
story, a single component of that story can be explained as an example and the larger 
story can be inferred.  
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Simultaneously, elements of the mundane artifacts, like the stretcher’s pencil 
markings, the evolution of the sea sled’s design, or the plotting board’s expanded range 
circles are tangible examples of the larger war story. They show the need for hasty 
construction to support the war effort, experimental and evolving design, and improved 
technology, respectively.  
CONCLUSION 
Mundane artifacts provide an opportunity to take a complex unit to its more basic 
and relatable elements. Many people may struggle to connect with larger ideas, like the 
technology of radar, the use of Kingfisher floatplanes, or the horrors of war. Using the 
plotting board, sea sled, and stretcher to share these stories makes the larger ideas 
more understandable. When combined with human stories and eye-catching artifacts, 
like the Kingfisher, mundane objects can then share well-rounded, interconnected, 
stories on many levels. These stories can be as simple as the artifact’s immediate use, 
while still connecting to share the battleship’s purpose and showcasing elements that 
implicate larger concepts like technological innovation and wartime production.  
These artifacts were functionally necessary to make the larger unit run. While 
their value may have been overlooked, as seen in the lack of specific mentions in the 
oral histories, because they were mundane and directly related to more complicated, 
“influential,” or flashy artifacts and technologies, they can be valued today for their 
explanative uses. Their biographies endure through their museum “chapter.” Continuing 
to view them as unimportant diminishes their value as relatable components of the 
larger story. Instead, using them can make interpretation — from basic explanations of 
their uses to the more complex wartime implications on technology and production — 
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more understandable to the general public. This creates a more complete history. The 
battleship North Carolina did not survive solely off large or ostentatious components. 
Smaller components made everyday operation of those showy pieces possible. 
Presenting even these stories makes the history more complete and more 
understandable. 
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